Our research center for Epistemic Game Theory is located at Maastricht University

Course in Epistemic Game Theory


Reading Group

The purpose of the reading group is to discuss published and ongoing research on epistemic game theory and related topics.



Non-standard analysis extends the real numbers by including an infinitesimal, which is a positive number that is strictly smaller than any positive real number. Such an infinitesimal can be viewed as a placeholder for an infinite sequence of positive real numbers converging to zero, which is often used in game theory and decision theory to model trembles or cautious beliefs. This non-standard analysis goes back to Robinson (1973). During the meeting we intend to discuss the field of non-standard numbers, some of its main properties, its connections to lexicographic beliefs and trembles, and how it can be useful for decision theory and game theory.




  • Order Independence in Games, January


  • Dynamic Psychological Games, Battigalli & Dufwenberg 2009, May
  • Static Psychological Games,  Geanakopols, Pearce and Stachetti 1989, April
  • Proof Mixmin Expected Utility, Gilboa & Schmeidler 1989, March
  • Maximin Expected Utility, Gilboa & Schmeidler 1989, February


  • Are the treasures of game theory ambiguous?, Eichberger & Kelsey 2008, November
  • The Logic of Backward Induction, Aumann & Arieli 2013, October
  • When do types induce the same belief hierarchy? A recursive procedure, September
  • Heterogeneous Quantal Response Equilibrium and Cognitive Hierarchies, Rogers, Palfrey and Camerer 2009, July
  • Rational Inattention, April
  • General Imaging, Lewis 1976, Gardenfors 1988, Perea 2009, February
  • When do two types induce the same belief hierarchy?, Perea 2014, January


  • Drawing a parallel between unawareness and common knowledge, Anna Zseleva, December
  • Introduction to unawareness in games II, Heifetz et al. 2006 & Heifetz et al. 2013, November
  • Introduction to unawareness in games I, Modica and Rustichini 1994 & Dekel et al. 1998 October
  • Completeness and Soundness of Propositional Logic II, August
  • Completeness and Soundness of Propositional Logic I, June
  • Zermelo and the Early History of Game Theory, Schwalbe&Walker 2001, May
  • Introduction to Quantum Game Theory, Meyer 1999, April


  • Strong belief and forward induction reasoning, Battigalli & Siniscalchi 2002, April
  • Hierarchies of conditional beliefs and interactive epistemology in dynamic games, Battigalli & Siniscalchi 1999, April
  • Belief in the opponents’ future rationality, Perea 2010, March
  • Rationality, Nash equilibrium and backwards induction in perfect-information games, Ben-Porath 1997, February


  • Admissibility in games, Brandenburger, Friedenberg & Keissler 2008, December
  • Proper rationalizability in lexicographic beliefs, Asheim 2001, November
  • Lexicographic probabilities, Blume, Brandenburger & Dekel 1991, October
  • Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge, Brandenburger & Dekel 1993, October
  • Correlated equilibrium as an expression of Bayesian rationality, Aumann 1987, September
  • A one-person doxastic characterization of Nash strategies, Perea 2007, May
  • Epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium, Aumann & Brandenburger 1995, May
  • The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games, Tan & Werlang 1988, May
  • Rationalizable strategic behavior, Bernheim 1984 & Pearce 1984, May

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