Reading Group

The purpose of the reading group is to discuss published and ongoing research on epistemic game theory and related topics.



Non-standard analysis extends the real numbers by including an infinitesimal, which is a positive number that is strictly smaller than any positive real number. Such an infinitesimal can be viewed as a placeholder for an infinite sequence of positive real numbers converging to zero, which is often used in game theory and decision theory to model trembles or cautious beliefs. This non-standard analysis goes back to Robinson (1973). During the meeting we intend to discuss the field of non-standard numbers, some of its main properties, its connections to lexicographic beliefs and trembles, and how it can be useful for decision theory and game theory.




  • Order Independence in Games, January


  • Dynamic Psychological Games, Battigalli & Dufwenberg 2009, May
  • Static Psychological Games,  Geanakopols, Pearce and Stachetti 1989, April
  • Proof Mixmin Expected Utility, Gilboa & Schmeidler 1989, March
  • Maximin Expected Utility, Gilboa & Schmeidler 1989, February


  • Are the treasures of game theory ambiguous?, Eichberger & Kelsey 2008, November
  • The Logic of Backward Induction, Aumann & Arieli 2013, October
  • When do types induce the same belief hierarchy? A recursive procedure, September
  • Heterogeneous Quantal Response Equilibrium and Cognitive Hierarchies, Rogers, Palfrey and Camerer 2009, July
  • Rational Inattention, April
  • General Imaging, Lewis 1976, Gardenfors 1988, Perea 2009, February
  • When do two types induce the same belief hierarchy?, Perea 2014, January


  • Drawing a parallel between unawareness and common knowledge, Anna Zseleva, December
  • Introduction to unawareness in games II, Heifetz et al. 2006 & Heifetz et al. 2013, November
  • Introduction to unawareness in games I, Modica and Rustichini 1994 & Dekel et al. 1998 October
  • Completeness and Soundness of Propositional Logic II, August
  • Completeness and Soundness of Propositional Logic I, June
  • Zermelo and the Early History of Game Theory, Schwalbe&Walker 2001, May
  • Introduction to Quantum Game Theory, Meyer 1999, April


  • Strong belief and forward induction reasoning, Battigalli & Siniscalchi 2002, April
  • Hierarchies of conditional beliefs and interactive epistemology in dynamic games, Battigalli & Siniscalchi 1999, April
  • Belief in the opponents’ future rationality, Perea 2010, March
  • Rationality, Nash equilibrium and backwards induction in perfect-information games, Ben-Porath 1997, February


  • Admissibility in games, Brandenburger, Friedenberg & Keissler 2008, December
  • Proper rationalizability in lexicographic beliefs, Asheim 2001, November
  • Lexicographic probabilities, Blume, Brandenburger & Dekel 1991, October
  • Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge, Brandenburger & Dekel 1993, October
  • Correlated equilibrium as an expression of Bayesian rationality, Aumann 1987, September
  • A one-person doxastic characterization of Nash strategies, Perea 2007, May
  • Epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium, Aumann & Brandenburger 1995, May
  • The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games, Tan & Werlang 1988, May
  • Rationalizable strategic behavior, Bernheim 1984 & Pearce 1984, May