Last Updated: May 7th, 2019
I am currently working on a new textbook, called "Epistemic Game Theory II: Non-Standard Games".
The purpose is to study games with incomplete information, games with unawareness, and psychological games in a unified way from an epistemic perspective.
I now completed Chapter 3, which is about Nash equilibrium and correlated equilibrium in standard games. I characterize Nash equilibrium by the notion of a simple belief hierarchy (as proposed in my first book on epistemic game theory), and characterize correlated equilibrium by the new notion of a symmetric belief hierarchy.
New Working Papers:
"Two Definitions of Correlated Equilibrium" (with Christian Bach)
"Common Belief in Future and Restricted Past Rationality" (with Rubén Becerril-Borja)
"Epistemic Game Theory", prepared for the Handbook of Rationality