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Two definitions of correlated equilibrium ☆

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ABSTRACT

Correlated equilibrium constitutes one of the basic solution concepts for static games with complete information. Actually two variants of correlated equilibrium are in circulation and have been used interchangeably in the literature. Besides the original notion due to Aumann (1974), there exists a simplified definition typically called canonical correlated equilibrium or correlated equilibrium distribution. It is known that the original and the canonical version of correlated equilibrium are equivalent from an ex-ante perspective. However, we show that they are actually distinct – both doxastically as well as behaviourally – from an interim perspective. An elucidation of this difference emerges in the reasoning realm: while Aumann's correlated equilibrium can be epistemically characterized by common belief in rationality and a common prior, canonical correlated equilibrium additionally requires the condition of one-theory-per-choice. Consequently, the application of correlated equilibrium requires a careful choice of the appropriate variant.

1. Introduction

Correlated equilibrium has been introduced by Aumann (1974) and represents one of the main solution concepts for static games with complete information. Two versions of this solution concept circulate in the literature and often no distinction is drawn between them. Indeed, both solution concepts are equivalent in terms of the (prior) probabilities assigned to choice profiles. Thus, both versions are rather perceived as substitutable. However, it turns out that the variation in defining correlated equilibrium can be significant from the so-called interim perspective once the probabilities are conditionalized on information. Both a player's belief about the opponents' choices as well as a player's optimal choice in line with the two notions then becomes different. This discrepancy can be elucidated in terms of reasoning by unveiling the epistemic assumptions underlying the two solution concepts. Consequently, care should be exerted when applying correlated equilibrium. The use of the particular version of correlated equilibrium should be driven by deliberate reflection about which of the – distinct – underlying epistemic assumptions are more appropriate for the specific purpose at hand.

Formally, Aumann's (1974) original solution concept of correlated equilibrium is constructed within an epistemic framework based on possible worlds, information partitions, and a common prior probability measure. Often, in scientific articles and game theory textbooks, a more direct definition of correlated equilibrium is used that simply models correlated equilibrium as a probability measure on choice combinations. The latter solution concept is sometimes called canonical correlated equilibrium (e.g. Forges, 1990) or correlated equilibrium distribution (e.g. Aumann, 1987) in the literature. The question arises whether these two definitions are actually interchangeable or whether they constitute two different solution concepts.

The analysis of games typically distinguishes three perspectives or stages: ex-ante, interim, and ex-post. From the ex-ante perspective players have not received any private information; epistemically players entertain prior beliefs in this stage of the game. Then, private information is unveiled to the players who update (or revise) their beliefs accordingly; the formation of these posterior beliefs as well as the subsequent choices take place in the interim stage of the game. From the ex-post perspective the outcome of the game as combination of the players' choices ensues.

Besides, solution concepts can generally not be compared directly due to possibly being embedded in different structures. For instance, the formulation of correlated equilibrium uses an epistemic framework, while canonical correlated equilibrium lacks

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such structure. However, since solution concepts all induce for every player decision-relevant i.e. interim beliefs about his opponents' choices, these beliefs as well as optimal choice in line with them can serve as a universal benchmark. In other words, the interim beliefs and subsequent optimal choices for every player can be viewed as the final output of a solution concept. It is thus always possible to compare any given solution concepts in the interim stage of a game.

The two versions of correlated equilibrium can be compared from an ex-ante as well as an interim perspective.[1] It is well-known that from the ex-ante perspective correlated equilibrium and canonical correlated equilibrium coincide. More precisely, the induced probability measure on choice combinations of a correlated equilibrium using the common prior only (and not the players' information) is equal to some canonical correlated equilibrium, and vice versa. This fact together with the consequence that any correlated equilibrium can be represented by some correlated equilibrium distribution is also known as the *revelation principle*. However, the relevant perspective for reasoning and decision-making in games seems to be interim. The posterior belief of a player about his opponents' choices – conditionalized on his information in the case of correlated equilibrium and conditionalized on one of his choices in the case of canonical correlated equilibrium – constitute the outcome of the player's reasoning and thus his decision-relevant doxastic mental state. In other words, the players' posterior beliefs represent a solution concept *doxastically*. Optimal choice in line with a player's reasoning then characterizes the respective solution concept *behaviourally*. An appropriate comparison of solution concepts in terms of their game-theoretic semantics thus needs to address these two – doxastic and behavioural – dimensions.

Here, we show that correlated equilibrium and canonical correlated equilibrium are neither doxastically nor behaviourally equivalent in the interim stage of a game. Thus, the revelation principle even though valid from the ex-ante perspective does no longer hold from the interim perspective. First of all, inspired by the game in Aumann and Dreze's (2008) Figure 2A, we illustrate that correlated equilibrium and canonical correlated equilibrium may induce different sets of first-order beliefs i.e. beliefs about the respective opponents' choice combinations, from an interim perspective. Secondly, we construct an example where correlated equilibrium and canonical correlated equilibrium also differ behaviourally, i.e. in terms of optimal choice. In this sense, correlated equilibrium and canonical correlated equilibrium constitute two distinct solution concepts for static games.

In order to conceptually understand the difference of correlated equilibrium and canonical correlated equilibrium, a reasoning angle is taken using the standard type-based approach. First of all, transformations from Aumann's epistemic framework to type-based models and back are defined. We show that these transformations turn correlated equilibria into epistemic models that satisfy a common prior assumption as well as contain types expressing common belief in rationality, and vice versa. An epistemic characterization of correlated equilibrium in terms of common belief in rationality and a common prior from an interim perspective consequently ensues.

We then introduce the epistemic condition of one-theory-per-choice. Intuitively, a reasoner satisfying this condition never uses in his entire belief hierarchy distinct first-order beliefs to explain the same choice for any player. We give an epistemic characterization of canonical correlated equilibrium in terms of common belief in rationality, a common prior, and the one-theory-per-choice condition from an interim perspective. In terms of reasoning, canonical correlated equilibrium thus constitutes a more demanding solution concept than correlated equilibrium. Conceptually, the one-theory-per-choice condition contains a correct beliefs assumption. Accordingly, the reasoner does not only always explain a given choice by the same first-order belief throughout his entire belief hierarchy, but he also believes his opponents to believe he does so, and he believes his opponents to believe their opponents to believe he does so, etc. Furthermore, the reasoner does not only believe any opponent to explain a given choice by the same first-order belief throughout his entire belief hierarchy, but he also believes his opponents to believe he does so, and he believes his opponents to believe their opponents to believe he does so, etc. In terms of correct beliefs properties, canonical correlated equilibrium thus is more demanding than Aumann's original solution concept of correlated equilibrium.

In applications caution is required which solution concept – correlated equilibrium or canonical correlated equilibrium – is used, since they are genuinely different in terms of reasoning and the diacritic one-theory-per-choice condition does constitute a substantial assumption. In cases where correct beliefs conditions seem less plausible, correlated equilibrium rather than canonical correlated equilibrium appears to be adequate, while in cases where correct beliefs conditions seem more appropriate, the latter rather than the former solution concept appears to be suitable. Importantly, note that the interpretation of our characterizations of correlated equilibrium and canonical correlated equilibrium does not imply that one of the two solution concepts qualifies as superior, but that they can be concluded to be non-trivially distinct and the one-theory-per-choice condition sheds conceptual light on this difference in terms of reasoning.

We proceed as follows. In Section 2, the two definitions of correlated equilibrium within the framework of static games are recalled. It is then shown in Section 3 that the two solution concepts are neither doxastically nor behaviourally equivalent in the interim stage. In Section 4, a reasoning framework by means of type-based epistemic models is presented which is later used to analyse correlated equilibrium and canonical correlated equilibrium. Both solution concepts are characterized epistemically from the perspective of the interim stage in Section 5 and their difference in terms of reasoning thereby illuminated. Finally, some conceptual issues are addressed in Section 6. In particular, a philosophical discussion about the relation of the two versions of correlated equilibrium to Nash equilibrium based on the epistemic characterization results from Section 5 is offered.

2. Preliminaries

A static game is modelled as a tuple $\Gamma = \left(I, (C_i)_{i\in I}, (U_i)_{i\in I}\right)$, where I is a finite set of players, C_i denotes player i's finite choice set, and $U_i : \times_{j\in I} C_j \to \mathbb{R}$ is player i's utility function, which assigns a real number $U_i(c)$ to every choice combination $c \in \times_{j\in I} C_j$. For the class of static games the solution concept of correlated equilibrium has been introduced by Aumann (1974) and given an epistemic foundation in terms of universal rationality and a common prior from an ex-ante perspective by Aumann (1987).[2] Loosely speaking, in a correlated equilibrium the players' choices are required to satisfy a best response property given a probability measure on the opponents' choice combinations

[1] In the ex-post stage of the game the outcome including all players' choices are common knowledge. Consequently, a comparison of solution concepts or reasoning patterns from the ex-post perspective is less insightful.

[2] Note that Aumann (1987) actually gives an epistemic characterization of canonical correlated equilibrium from an ex-ante perspective. However, since correlated equilibrium and canonical correlated equilibrium are equivalent from an ex-ante perspective, Aumann's (1987) epistemic characterization also applies to correlated equilibrium.

derived from a common prior via Bayesian updating within some information structure.

In fact, the notion of correlated equilibrium is embedded in the epistemic framework of Aumann models, which describe the players' knowledge and beliefs in terms of information partitions. Formally, an *Aumann model* of a game Γ is a tuple $\mathcal{A}^\Gamma = \big(\Omega, \pi, (\mathcal{I}_i)_{i\in I}, (\sigma_i)_{i\in I}\big)$, where Ω is a finite set of all possible worlds, $\pi \in \Delta(\Omega)$ is a common prior probability measure on the set of all possible worlds, $\mathcal{I}_i$ is an information partition on Ω for every player $i \in I$ such that $\pi\big(\mathcal{I}_i(\omega)\big) > 0$ for all $\omega \in \Omega$, with $\mathcal{I}_i(\omega)$ denoting the cell of $\mathcal{I}_i$ containing ω, and $\sigma_i : \Omega \to C_i$ is an $\mathcal{I}_i$-measurable choice function for every player $i \in I$. Conceptually, the $\mathcal{I}_i$-measurability of σ_i ensures that i entertains no uncertainty whatsoever about his own choice, i.e. $\sigma_i(\omega') = \sigma_i(\omega)$ for all $\omega' \in \mathcal{I}_i(\omega)$. A player's choice is thus constant across a cell from his information partition. Formally, the choice induced by a cell $P_i \in \mathcal{I}_i$ is denoted by $\sigma_i(P_i) := \sigma_i(\omega)$ for some $\omega \in P_i$. Note that beliefs of players are explicitly expressible in Aumann models of games. Indeed, beliefs are obtained via Bayesian conditionalization on the common prior given the respective player's information. More precisely, an event $E \subseteq \Omega$ consists of possible worlds, and player i's belief in E at a world ω is defined as $b_i(E, \omega) := \pi\big(E \mid \mathcal{I}_i(\omega)\big) = \frac{\pi\left(E \cap \mathcal{I}_i(\omega)\right)}{\pi\left(\mathcal{I}_i(\omega)\right)}$. For instance, given a choice combination $s_{-i} := (s_j)_{j\in I\setminus\{i\}}$ of player i's opponents, the set $\{\omega \in \Omega : \sigma_j(\omega) = s_j \text{ for all } j \in I \setminus \{i\}\}$ denotes the event that i's opponents play according to s_{-i}. In the sequel whenever for a given player i a combination of objects for his opponents are considered the following notation is used: if O_j are sets for every player $j \in I$, then $O_{-i} := \times_{j\in I\setminus\{i\}} O_j$ denotes the corresponding product set of i's opponents and $o_{-i} := (o_j)_{j\in I\setminus\{i\}} \in O_{-i}$ denotes a combination of objects – drawn from O_j for every $j \in I \setminus \{i\}$ – for i's opponents.

Within the framework of Aumann models, the notion of correlated equilibrium – sometimes also called objective correlated equilibrium – is formally defined as follows.

Definition 1. Let Γ be a game, and $\mathcal{A}^\Gamma$ an Aumann model of it with choice functions $\sigma_i : \Omega \to C_i$ for every player $i \in I$. The tuple $(\sigma_i)_{i\in I}$ of choice functions constitutes a *correlated equilibrium*, if for every player $i \in I$, and for every world $\omega \in \Omega$, it is the case that

$$\sum_{\omega' \in \mathcal{I}_i(\omega)} \pi\big(\omega' \mid \mathcal{I}_i(\omega)\big) \cdot U_i\big(\sigma_i(\omega), \sigma_{-i}(\omega')\big) \geq \sum_{\omega' \in \mathcal{I}_i(\omega)} \pi\big(\omega' \mid \mathcal{I}_i(\omega)\big) \cdot U_i\big(c_i, \sigma_{-i}(\omega')\big)$$

for every choice $c_i \in C_i$.

Intuitively, a choice function tuple constitutes a correlated equilibrium, if for every player, the choice function specifies at every world a best response given the common prior conditionalized on the player's information and given the opponents' choice functions. Note that this definition of correlated equilibrium corresponds precisely to Aumann's (1974) original definition. In particular, the imposition of the best response property on all worlds also including the ones that may lie outside the support of the common prior π occurs in the original definition.

Aumann structures induce for every player a probability measure at every world about the respective opponents' choices – typically called first-order belief – via an appropriate projection of the conditionalized common prior. Given a game Γ a first-order belief $\beta_i \in \Delta(C_{-i})$ of some player $i \in I$ is *possible in a correlated equilibrium*, if there exists an Aumann model $\mathcal{A}^\Gamma$ of Γ such that the tuple $(\sigma_j)_{j\in I}$ constitutes a correlated equilibrium and with some world $\hat{\omega} \in \Omega$ such that

$$\beta_i(c_{-i}) = \pi\big(\{\omega' \in \mathcal{I}_i(\hat{\omega}) : \sigma_{-i}(\omega') = c_{-i}\} \mid \mathcal{I}_i(\hat{\omega})\big)$$

for all $c_{-i} \in C_{-i}$.

From a behavioural viewpoint it is ultimately of interest what choices a player can make given a particular line of reasoning and decision-making fixed by specific epistemic assumptions or by a specific solution concept. Formally, given a game Γ a choice $c_i^* \in C_i$ of some player $i \in I$ is *optimal in a correlated equilibrium*, if there exists an Aumann model $\mathcal{A}^\Gamma$ of Γ such that the tuple $(\sigma_j)_{j\in I}$ constitutes a correlated equilibrium and with some world $\hat{\omega} \in \Omega$ such that

$$\sum_{\omega' \in \mathcal{I}_i(\hat{\omega})} \pi\big(\omega' \mid \mathcal{I}_i(\hat{\omega})\big) \cdot U_i\big(c_i^*, \sigma_{-i}(\omega')\big) \geq \sum_{\omega' \in \mathcal{I}_i(\hat{\omega})} \pi\big(\omega' \mid \mathcal{I}_i(\hat{\omega})\big) \cdot U_i\big(c_i, \sigma_{-i}(\omega')\big)$$

for all $c_i \in C_i$.

Often, in the literature and in textbooks, the following more direct – and simpler – definition of correlated equilibrium is used.

Definition 2. Let Γ be a game, and $\rho \in \Delta(\times_{i\in I} C_i)$ a probability measure on the players' choice combinations. The probability measure ρ constitutes a *canonical correlated equilibrium*, if for every player $i \in I$, and for every choice $c_i \in C_i$ of player i such that $\rho(c_i) > 0$, it is the case that

$$\sum_{c_{-i} \in C_{-i}} \rho(c_{-i} \mid c_i) \cdot U_i(c_i, c_{-i}) \geq \sum_{c_{-i} \in C_{-i}} \rho(c_{-i} \mid c_i) \cdot U_i(c_i', c_{-i})$$

for every choice $c_i' \in C_i$, where $\rho(c_i) := \sum_{c_{-i} \in C_{-i}} \rho(c_i, c_{-i})$ as well as $\rho(c_{-i} \mid c_i) := \frac{\rho(c_i, c_{-i})}{\rho(c_i)}$.

Intuitively, a probability measure on the players' choice combinations constitutes a canonical correlated equilibrium, if every choice that receives positive probability is optimal given the probability measure conditionalized on the very choice itself.

Also, the solution concept of canonical correlated equilibrium naturally induces for every player a first-order belief for each of his choices via Bayesian conditionalization. Given a game Γ, a first-order belief $\beta_i \in \Delta(C_{-i})$ of some player $i \in I$ is *possible in a canonical correlated equilibrium*, if there exists a canonical correlated equilibrium $\rho \in \Delta(\times_{j\in I} C_j)$ and a choice $\hat{c}_i \in C_i$ of player i with $\rho(\hat{c}_i) > 0$ such that

$$\beta_i(c_{-i}) = \rho(c_{-i} \mid \hat{c}_i)$$

for all $c_{-i} \in C_{-i}$.

Finally, optimal choice with a canonical correlated equilibrium also needs to be fixed in order to relate the two definitions of correlated equilibrium behaviourally. Formally, given a game Γ, a choice $c_i^* \in C_i$ of some player $i \in I$ is *optimal in a canonical correlated equilibrium*, if there exist a canonical correlated equilibrium $\rho \in \Delta(\times_{j\in I} C_j)$ and a choice $\hat{c}_i \in C_i$ of player i with $\rho(\hat{c}_i) > 0$ such that

$$\sum_{c_{-i} \in C_{-i}} \rho(c_{-i} \mid \hat{c}_i) \cdot U_i(c_i^*, c_{-i}) \geq \sum_{c_{-i} \in C_{-i}} \rho(c_{-i} \mid \hat{c}_i) \cdot U_i(c_i, c_{-i})$$

for all $c_i \in C_i$.

It is well known that the two solution concepts of correlated equilibrium and canonical correlated equilibrium induce the same prior measure on choice profiles. For the sake of self-containedness and as an explicit demarcation to our results a statement and proof of the so-called revelation principle is provided.

Theorem 1 (*"Revelation Principle"*)**.** *Let Γ be a static game.*

(i) *If $\mathcal{A}^\Gamma$ is an Aumann model of Γ such that $(\sigma_i)_{i\in I}$ constitutes a correlated equilibrium, then $\rho \in \Delta(\times_{i\in I} C_i)$, where $\rho\big((c_i)_{i\in I}\big) := \pi\big(\{\omega \in \Omega : \sigma_i(\omega) = c_i \text{ for all } i \in I\}\big)$ for all $(c_i)_{i\in I} \in \times_{i\in I} C_i$, constitutes a canonical correlated equilibrium.*

(*ii*) *If* $\rho \in \Delta(\times_{i\in I} C_i)$ *constitutes a canonical correlated equilibrium, then there exists an Aumann model* $\mathcal{A}^\Gamma$ *of* Γ *such that* $\pi(\omega) := \rho\Big(\big(\sigma_i(\omega)\big)_{i\in I}\Big)$ *for all* $\omega \in \Omega$ *as well as* $(\sigma_i)_{i\in I}$ *constitutes a correlated equilibrium.*

Proof. For part (*i*) of the theorem, let $i \in I$ be some player and $c_i \in C_i$ be some choice of player i such that $\rho(c_i) > 0$. Then,

$$\begin{aligned}
\rho(c_{-i} \mid c_i) &= \frac{\pi\big(\{\omega \in \Omega : \sigma_j(\omega) = c_j \text{ for all } j \in I\}\big)}{\pi\big(\omega \in \Omega : \sigma_i(\omega) = c_i\big)} \\
&= \frac{\pi\big(\{\omega \in \Omega : \sigma_j(\omega) = c_j \text{ for all } j \in I\}\big)}{\pi\big(\cup_{P_i \in \mathcal{I}_i : \sigma_i(P_i) = c_i} P_i\big)} \\
&= \sum_{\hat{P}_i \in \mathcal{I}_i : \sigma_i(\hat{P}_i) = c_i} \frac{\pi\big(\omega \in \hat{P}_i : \sigma_j(\omega) = c_j \text{ for all } j \in I \setminus \{i\}\big)}{\pi\big(\cup_{P_i \in \mathcal{I}_i : \sigma_i(P_i) = c_i} P_i\big)} \\
&= \sum_{\hat{P}_i \in \mathcal{I}_i : \sigma_i(\hat{P}_i) = c_i} \frac{\pi(\hat{P}_i)}{\pi\big(\cup_{P_i \in \mathcal{I}_i : \sigma_i(P_i) = c_i} P_i\big)} \\
&\quad \cdot \frac{\pi\big(\omega \in \hat{P}_i : \sigma_j(\omega) = c_j \text{ for all } j \in I \setminus \{i\}\big)}{\pi(\hat{P}_i)} \\
&= \sum_{\hat{P}_i \in \mathcal{I}_i : \sigma_i(\hat{P}_i) = c_i} \frac{\pi(\hat{P}_i)}{\pi\big(\cup_{P_i \in \mathcal{I}_i : \sigma_i(P_i) = c_i} P_i\big)} \\
&\quad \cdot \sum_{\omega \in \hat{P}_i : \sigma_j(\omega) = c_j \text{ for all } j \in I \setminus \{i\}} \pi(\omega \mid \hat{P}_i)
\end{aligned}$$

holds for all $c_{-i} \in C_{-i}$. Since $(\sigma_i)_{i\in I}$ constitutes a correlated equilibrium, it follows that

$$\begin{aligned}
&\sum_{c_{-i} \in C_{-i}} \rho(c_{-i} \mid c_i) \cdot U_i(c_i, c_{-i}) \\
&= \sum_{\hat{P}_i \in \mathcal{I}_i : \sigma_i(\hat{P}_i) = c_i} \frac{\pi(\hat{P}_i)}{\pi\big(\cup_{P_i \in \mathcal{I}_i : \sigma_i(P_i) = c_i} P_i\big)} \\
&\quad \cdot \sum_{c_{-i} \in C_{-i}} \sum_{\omega \in \hat{P}_i : \sigma_j(\omega) = c_j \text{ for all } j \in I \setminus \{i\}} \pi(\omega \mid \hat{P}_i) \cdot U_i\big(c_i, \sigma_{-i}(\omega)\big) \\
&= \sum_{\hat{P}_i \in \mathcal{I}_i : \sigma_i(\hat{P}_i) = c_i} \frac{\pi(\hat{P}_i)}{\pi\big(\cup_{P_i \in \mathcal{I}_i : \sigma_i(P_i) = c_i} P_i\big)} \cdot \sum_{\omega \in \hat{P}_i} \pi(\omega \mid \hat{P}_i) \cdot U_i\big(c_i, \sigma_{-i}(\omega)\big) \\
&\geq \sum_{\hat{P}_i \in \mathcal{I}_i : \sigma_i(\hat{P}_i) = c_i} \frac{\pi(\hat{P}_i)}{\pi\big(\cup_{P_i \in \mathcal{I}_i : \sigma_i(P_i) = c_i} P_i\big)} \cdot \sum_{\omega \in \hat{P}_i} \pi(\omega \mid \hat{P}_i) \cdot U_i\big(c_i', \sigma_{-i}(\omega)\big) \\
&= \sum_{c_{-i} \in C_{-i}} \rho(c_{-i} \mid c_i) \cdot U_i(c_i', c_{-i})
\end{aligned}$$

for all $c_i' \in C_i$. Consequently, ρ constitutes a canonical correlated equilibrium.

For part (*ii*) of the theorem, construct an Aumann model $\mathcal{A}^\Gamma$ with $\Omega := \{\omega^{(c_j)_{j\in I}} : (c_j)_{j\in I} \in \times_{j\in I} C_j \text{ such that } \rho\big((c_j)_{j\in I}\big) > 0\}$, $\mathcal{I}_j := \Big\{\{\omega^{(c_j, c_{-j})} \in \Omega : c_{-j} \in C_{-j}\} : c_j \in C_j \text{ with } \rho(c_j) > 0\Big\}$ for all $j \in I$, $\pi\big(\omega^{(c_j)_{j\in I}}\big) := \rho\big((c_j)_{j\in I}\big)$ for all $\omega^{(c_j)_{j\in I}} \in \Omega$, and $\sigma_j(\omega^{(c_k)_{k\in I}}) = c_j$ for all $\omega^{(c_k)_{k\in I}} \in \Omega$ and for all $j \in I$.[3] Hence, $\mathcal{A}^\Gamma$ satisfies the property that $\pi(\omega) := \rho\Big(\big(\sigma_j(\omega)\big)_{j\in I}\Big)$ for all $\omega \in \Omega$. As ρ constitutes a canonical correlated equilibrium, observe that

$$\begin{aligned}
&\sum_{\omega \in \mathcal{I}_i(\omega^{(\hat{c}_i, c_{-i})})} \pi\big(\omega \mid \mathcal{I}_i(\omega^{(\hat{c}_i, c_{-i})})\big) \cdot U_i\big(\sigma_i(\omega^{(\hat{c}_i, c_{-i})}), \sigma_{-i}(\omega)\big) \\
&= \sum_{c_{-i} \in C_{-i}} \rho(c_{-i} \mid \hat{c}_i) \cdot U_i(\hat{c}_i, c_{-i}) \geq \sum_{c_{-i} \in C_{-i}} \rho(c_{-i} \mid \hat{c}_i) \cdot U_i(c_i', c_{-i}) \\
&= \sum_{\omega \in \mathcal{I}_i(\omega^{(\hat{c}_i, c_{-i})})} \pi\big(\omega \mid \mathcal{I}_i(\omega^{(\hat{c}_i, c_{-i})})\big) \cdot U_i\big(c_i', \sigma_{-i}(\omega)\big)
\end{aligned}$$

holds for every choice $c_i' \in C_i$ and for every player $i \in I$, i.e. $(\sigma_i)_{i\in I}$ constitutes a correlated equilibrium. ■

The essential intuition underlying Theorem 1 about the relation of the two versions of correlated equilibrium could be grasped as follows. For part (*i*), since the possible worlds inducing c_i via σ_i form a union of cells from $\mathcal{I}_i$, the inequality in Definition 1 requires c_i to be a best response for every cell of $\mathcal{I}_i$, while the inequality in Definition 2 only needs c_i to satisfy the best response property for the union of cells inducing c_i. Since the latter requirement is weaker than the former, a canonical correlated equilibrium ensues based on a correlated equilibrium. For part (*ii*), the sparser embedding of canonical correlated equilibrium is mimicked in the potentially richer structure of correlated equilibrium by constructing the "canonical" Aumann model. The best response property of canonical correlated equilibrium then directly carries over and yields the correlated equilibrium.

Importantly, the revelation principle (Theorem 1) exclusively relates the two versions of correlated equilibrium from the ex-ante perspective before any information has been received and processed by the players. Formally, the compared objects π and ρ are *prior* probability measures. Theorem 1 thus establishes the equivalence of correlated equilibrium and canonical equilibrium in the ex-ante stage of games.

3. Difference of the two definitions

With two prevalent notions of correlated equilibrium in the literature that induce the same prior measure about choice profiles in games, the natural question emerges whether they are also equivalent or not from an *interim* perspective. In other words, it can be investigated whether the revelation principle is robust across the different stages of the game. From the interim perspective players have processed all information and formed their decision-relevant beliefs upon which they will subsequently base their choices. The two solution concepts can thus be compared doxastically as well as behaviourally after information processing.

Suppose that a first-order belief $\beta_i \in \Delta(C_{-i})$ is possible in a canonical correlated equilibrium of some game Γ, i.e. $\beta_i(c_{-i}) = \rho(c_{-i} \mid \hat{c}_i)$ for all $c_{-i} \in C_{-i}$ for some canonical correlated equilibrium $\rho \in \Delta(\times_{j\in I} C_j)$ of Γ and for some choice $\hat{c}_i \in C_i$ with $\rho(\hat{c}_i) > 0$. Consider the constructed Aumann model $\mathcal{A}^\Gamma$ in the proof of part (*ii*) of Theorem 1, where $(\sigma_j)_{j\in I}$ constitutes a correlated equilibrium. It is also the case that $\rho(c_{-i} \mid \hat{c}_i) = \pi\Big(\{\omega \in \mathcal{I}_i\big(\omega^{(\hat{c}_i, c_{-i})}\big) : \sigma_{-i}\big(\omega\big) = c_{-i}\} \mid \mathcal{I}_i\big(\omega^{(\hat{c}_i, c_{-i})}\big)\Big)$. Consequently, the following remark obtains.

Remark 1. Let Γ be a static game, $i \in I$ some player, and $\beta_i^* \in \Delta(C_{-i})$ some first-order belief of player *i*. If β_i^* is possible in a canonical correlated equilibrium, then β_i^* is possible in a correlated equilibrium.

The definition of optimal choice in a solution concept together with Remark 1 directly implies that optimality in a canonical correlated equilibrium implies optimality in a correlated equilibrium.

Remark 2. Let Γ be a static game, $i \in I$ some player, and $c_i^* \in C_i$ some choice of player *i*. If c_i^* is optimal in a canonical correlated equilibrium, then c_i^* is optimal in a correlated equilibrium.

[3] Note that the possible worlds are indexed with the players' choice profiles; thus for every choice combination in Γ there is a corresponding possible world in the Aumann model $\mathcal{A}^\Gamma$, and vice versa.

		Colin		
		L	C	R
Rowena	T	$0,0$	$4,5$	$5,4$
	M	$5,4$	$0,0$	$4,5$
	B	$4,5$	$5,4$	$0,0$

Fig. 1. A two player static game between *Rowena* and *Colin*.

		Bob			
		e	f	g	h
Alice	a	$1,1$	$2,3$	$3,2$	$0,1$
	b	$3,2$	$1,1$	$2,3$	$2,2$
	c	$2,3$	$3,2$	$1,1$	$1,3$
	d	$3,0$	$0,0$	$0,0$	$0,1$

Fig. 2. A two player static game between *Alice* and *Bob*.

However, it is now shown by means of an example that the converse of Remark 1 does not hold.

Example 1. Consider the two player game between *Rowena* and *Colin* depicted in Fig. 1, which is due to Aumann and Dreze (2008, Figure 2A).[4]

Let $\left(\Omega, \pi, (\mathcal{I}_i)_{i\in I}, (\sigma_i)_{i\in I}\right)$ be an Aumann model of the game, where

- $I = \{Rowena, Colin\}$,
- $\Omega = \{\omega_1, \omega_2, \omega_3, \omega_4, \omega_5, \omega_6, \omega_7\}$,
- $\pi \in \Delta(\Omega)$ with $\pi(\omega_1) = \pi(\omega_3) = \frac{1}{12}$ and $\pi(\omega) = \frac{1}{6}$ for all $\omega \in \Omega \setminus \{\omega_1, \omega_3\}$,
- $\mathcal{I}_{Rowena} = \big\{\{\omega_1\}, \{\omega_2, \omega_3\}, \{\omega_4, \omega_5\}, \{\omega_6, \omega_7\}\big\}$,
- $\mathcal{I}_{Colin} = \big\{\{\omega_1, \omega_3, \omega_5\}, \{\omega_2, \omega_7\}, \{\omega_4, \omega_6\}\big\}$,
- $\sigma_{Rowena}(\omega_1) = \sigma_{Rowena}(\omega_2) = \sigma_{Rowena}(\omega_3) = T$, $\sigma_{Rowena}(\omega_4) = \sigma_{Rowena}(\omega_5) = M$, and $\sigma_{Rowena}(\omega_6) = \sigma_{Rowena}(\omega_7) = B$,
- $\sigma_{Colin}(\omega_1) = \sigma_{Colin}(\omega_3) = \sigma_{Colin}(\omega_5) = R$, $\sigma_{Colin}(\omega_2) = \sigma_{Colin}(\omega_7) = C$, and $\sigma_{Colin}(\omega_4) = \sigma_{Colin}(\omega_6) = L$.

Observe that $(\sigma_i)_{i\in I}$ constitutes a correlated equilibrium of the game. Also, the first-order belief $\beta^*_{Rowena} \in \Delta(C_{Colin})$ of *Rowena* such that $\beta^*_{Rowena}(R) = 1$ is possible in a correlated equilibrium, as $\mathcal{I}_{Rowena}(\omega_1) = \{\omega_1\}$ and $\sigma_{Colin}(\omega_1) = R$.

Suppose that there exists a canonical correlated equilibrium $\rho \in \Delta(C_{Rowena} \times C_{Colin})$ with $\rho(\cdot \mid c_{Rowena}) = \beta^*_{Rowena}$ for some $c_{Rowena} \in C_{Rowena}$ such that $\rho(c_{Rowena}) > 0$. Since c_{Rowena} is optimal for $\rho(\cdot \mid c_{Rowena}) = \beta^*_{Rowena}$, it is the case that $c_{Rowena} = T$. Hence, $\rho(\cdot \mid T) = \beta^*_{Rowena}$ and thus $\rho(R \mid T) = 1$. Consequently, $\rho(T, R) > 0$ as well as $\rho(T, L) = \rho(T, C) = 0$. Then, $\rho(M, C) = \rho(B, C) = 0$, as otherwise C is strictly dominated by L on $\{M, B\}$, contradicting the optimality of C given $\rho(\cdot \mid C) \in \Delta(\{M, B\})$. Then, $\rho(B, L) = \rho(B, R) = 0$, as otherwise B is strictly dominated by M on $\{L, R\}$, contradicting the optimality of B given $\rho(\cdot \mid B) \in \Delta(\{L, R\})$. Then, $\rho(M, L) = 0$, as otherwise L is strictly dominated by R on $\{M\}$, contradicting the optimality of L given $\rho(\cdot \mid L) \in \Delta(\{M\})$. Then, $\rho(M, R) = 0$, as otherwise M is strictly dominated by T on $\{R\}$, contradicting the optimality of M given $\rho(\cdot \mid M) \in \Delta(\{R\})$. Therefore, it is the case that $\rho(T, R) = 1$. However, R is not optimal given $\rho(\cdot \mid R)$, a contradiction. Hence, the first-order belief $\beta^*_{Rowena} \in \Delta(C_{Colin})$ of *Rowena* such that $\beta^*_{Rowena}(R) = 1$ is not possible in a canonical correlated equilibrium. ♣

The preceding example establishes the following remark.

Remark 3. There exist a game Γ, a player $i \in I$, and a first-order belief $\beta^*_i \in \Delta(C_{-i})$ of player i such that β^*_i is possible in a correlated equilibrium but β^*_i is not possible in a canonical correlated equilibrium.

[4] In fact, Aumann and Dreze (2008) use the game depicted in Fig. 1 to show that *Rowena*'s expected payoff in a canonical correlated equilibrium can be different if the game is doubled in the sense that each of her choices is listed twice. The game is thus changed but only the solution concept of canonical correlated equilibrium is considered. Here, we keep the game fixed, but switch between the solution concepts of correlated equilibrium and canonical correlated equilibrium.

Intuitively, the difference established by Remark 3 is due to the richer structure of correlated equilibrium in terms of Aumann models potentially allowing for more first-order beliefs than canonical correlated equilibrium. Consider some choice $c_i \in C_i$ of player i with $\rho(c_i) > 0$. For every cell $P_i \in \mathcal{I}_i$ such that $\sigma_i(P_i) = c_i$ there could basically exist a distinct corresponding first-order beliefs $\pi(\cdot \mid P_i)$. However, with the probability measure ρ the unique first-order belief corresponding to c_i is given by $\rho(\cdot \mid c_i)$. The only link between these two first-order beliefs consists in the latter being a convex combination of the former, as c_i under canonical correlated equilibrium is equivalent to the union of the cells inducing c_i under correlated equilibrium.

Actually, in Example 1 the induced optimal choices are equal for both solution concepts despite their difference in terms of possible first-order beliefs. Indeed, observe that $\rho \in \Delta(C_{Rowena} \times C_{Colin})$ with $\rho(c) = \frac{1}{9}$ for all $c \in C_{Rowena} \times C_{Colin}$ constitutes a canonical correlated equilibrium of the game depicted in Fig. 1 and for every player it is the case that every choice is optimal in ρ. Also, the correlated equilibrium $(\sigma_i)_{i\in I}$ of this game from Example 1 exhibits the property that for every player it is the case that every choice is optimal.

Yet, both definitions of correlated equilibrium can also be distinct in terms of induced optimal choice as the next example shows.

Example 2. Consider the two player game between *Alice* and *Bob* depicted in Fig. 2.

Suppose the Aumann model $\left(\Omega, \pi, (\mathcal{I}_i)_{i\in I}, (\hat{\sigma}_i)_{i\in I}\right)$ of the game, where

- $\Omega = \{\omega_1, \omega_2, \omega_3, \omega_4, \omega_5, \omega_6, \omega_7\}$,
- $\pi(\omega_1) = \pi(\omega_2) = \pi(\omega_5) = \pi(\omega_6) = \pi(\omega_7) = \frac{1}{6}$ and $\pi(\omega_3) = \pi(\omega_4) = \frac{1}{12}$,
- $\mathcal{I}_{Alice} = \{\{\omega_1, \omega_2\}, \{\omega_3\}, \{\omega_4, \omega_5\}, \{\omega_6, \omega_7\}\}$,
- $\mathcal{I}_{Bob} = \{\{\omega_3, \omega_4, \omega_6\}, \{\omega_1, \omega_7\}, \{\omega_2, \omega_5\}\}$,
- $\sigma_{Alice}(\omega_1) = \sigma_{Alice}(\omega_2) = a$, $\sigma_{Alice}(\omega_3) = \sigma_{Alice}(\omega_4) = \sigma_{Alice}(\omega_5) = b$, and $\sigma_{Alice}(\omega_6) = \sigma_{Alice}(\omega_7) = c$,
- $\sigma_{Bob}(\omega_1) = \sigma_{Bob}(\omega_7) = f$, $\sigma_{Bob}(\omega_2) = \sigma_{Bob}(\omega_5) = g$, and $\sigma_{Bob}(\omega_3) = \sigma_{Bob}(\omega_4) = \sigma_{Bob}(\omega_6) = e$.

Observe that $(\sigma_{Alice}, \sigma_{Bob})$ constitute a correlated equilibrium. Also, the choice d of *Alice* – even though $d \notin \text{supp}(\sigma_{Alice})$ – is optimal in the correlated equilibrium $(\sigma_{Alice}, \sigma_{Bob})$, since d is optimal for *Alice* at world ω_3.

However, it is now shown that d cannot be optimal in a canonical correlated equilibrium. Towards a contradiction, suppose that there exists a canonical correlated equilibrium $\rho \in \Delta(C_{Alice} \times C_{Bob})$, for which d is optimal. Then, $\rho(e \mid c_1) = 1$ for some choice $c_1 \in C_{Alice}$ with $\rho(c_1) > 0$, as otherwise c would be strictly better than d for *Alice*. Since c_1 needs to be optimal for $\rho(\cdot \mid c_1)$, it must be the case that $c_1 = b$ or $c_1 = d$.

Suppose that $c_1 = d$. Then, $\rho(e \mid d) = 1$ implies that $\rho(e) > 0$, which in turn implies that e is optimal for $\rho(\cdot \mid e)$. As $\rho(d \mid e) > 0$, the choice h is thus better than e, a contradiction.

Alternatively, suppose that $c_1 = b$, and thus $\rho(e \mid b) = 1$. It has to be the case that $\rho(d) = 0$, as otherwise d is optimal for $\rho(\cdot \mid d)$, hence $\rho(e \mid d) = 1$, a contradiction. Because $\rho(d) = 0$ and $\rho(e \mid b) = 1$, it follows that $\rho(b, g) = 0$ as well as $\rho(d, g) = 0$. Therefore, $\rho(b \mid g) = \rho(d \mid g) = 0$ if $\rho(g) > 0$. Yet, if $\rho(g) > 0$, then f is better than g against $\rho(\cdot \mid g)$, because in that case $\rho(b \mid g) = \rho(d \mid g) = 0$. This is a contradiction, and thus $\rho(g) = 0$. Consequently, if $\rho(a) > 0$, then $\rho(g \mid a) = 0$, and thus c is better than a against $\rho(\cdot \mid a)$, a contradiction, hence $\rho(a) = 0$.

Since $\rho(a) = \rho(d) = 0$ as well as $\rho(e \mid b) = 1$, it is the case that $\rho(a, f) = \rho(d, f) = \rho(b, f) = 0$, and therefore $\rho(c \mid f) = 1$ if $\rho(f) > 0$. But then, if $\rho(f) > 0$, the choice e is better than f against $\rho(\cdot \mid f)$, a contradiction, and thus $\rho(f) = 0$.

As $\rho(f) = \rho(g) = 0$, it is the case that $\rho(f \mid c) = \rho(g \mid c) = 0$ if $\rho(c) > 0$. Hence, if $\rho(c) > 0$, the choice b is better than c against $\rho(\cdot \mid c)$, a contradiction, and thus $\rho(c) = 0$.

Since $\rho(a) = \rho(c) = \rho(d) = 0$ as well as $\rho(e \mid b) = 1$, it is the case that $\rho(b, e) = 1$. But then $\rho(b \mid e) = 1$, and thus g is better than e against $\rho(\cdot \mid e)$, a contradiction.

Consequently, there exists no canonical correlated equilibrium for which d is optimal. ♣

Thus, the following remark ensues.

Remark 4. There exists a game Γ, some player $i \in I$, and some choice $c_i^* \in C_i$ of player i such that c_i^* is optimal in a correlated equilibrium but c_i^* is not optimal in a canonical correlated equilibrium.

Intuitively, since correlated equilibrium admits more first-order beliefs than canonical correlated equilibrium, the resulting flexibility for supporting beliefs results in more choices being optimal in the former solution concept than in the latter.

Due to Remarks 3 and 4 correlated equilibrium and canonical correlated equilibrium differ both doxastically as well as behaviourally. Hence, the two notions actually constitute genuinely distinct solution concepts for static games.

4. Epistemic models

Reasoning in games is usually modelled by belief hierarchies about the underlying space of uncertainty. Due to Harsanyi (1967-68) types can be used as implicit representations of belief hierarchies. The notion of an epistemic model provides the framework to formally describe reasoning in games.

Definition 3. Let Γ be a static game. An *epistemic model* of Γ is a tuple $\mathcal{M}^\Gamma = \big((T_i)_{i\in I}, (b_i)_{i\in I}\big)$, where for every player $i \in I$

- T_i is a finite set of types,
- $b_i : T_i \to \Delta(C_{-i} \times T_{-i})$ assigns to every type $t_i \in T_i$ a probability measure $b_i[t_i]$ on the set of opponents' choice type combinations.

Given a game and an epistemic model of it, belief hierarchies, marginal beliefs, as well as marginal belief hierarchies can be derived from every type. For instance, every type $t_i \in T_i$ induces a belief on the opponents' choice combinations by marginalizing the probability measure $b_i[t_i]$ on the space C_{-i}. Note that no additional notation is introduced for marginal beliefs, in order to keep notation as sparse as possible. It should always be clear from the context which belief $b_i[t_i]$ refers to.

Besides, we follow a one-player perspective approach, which considers game theory as an interactive extension of decision theory. Accordingly, all epistemic concepts – including iterated ones – are defined as mental states inside the mind of a single person. A one-player approach seems natural in the sense that reasoning is formally represented by epistemic concepts and any reasoning process prior to choice does indeed take place entirely *within* the reasoner's mind. Formally, this approach is parsimonious in the sense that states, describing the beliefs of all players, do not have to be invoked in epistemic models of games.

Some further notions and notation are now introduced. For that purpose consider a game Γ, an epistemic model $\mathcal{M}^\Gamma$ of it, and fix two players $i, j \in I$ such that $i \neq j$.

A type $t_i \in T_i$ is said to *deem possible* some choice type combination (c_{-i}, t_{-i}) of his opponents, if $b_i[t_i]$ assigns positive probability to (c_{-i}, t_{-i}). Analogously, a type $t_i \in T_i$ deems possible some opponent type $t_j \in T_j$, if $b_i[t_i]$ assigns positive probability to t_j.

For each choice type combination (c_i, t_i), the *expected utility* is given by

$$u_i(c_i, t_i) = \sum_{c_{-i}\in C_{-i}} \big(b_i[t_i](c_{-i}) \cdot U_i(c_i, c_{-i})\big).$$

Intuitively, the common prior assumption in economics states that every belief in models with multiple agents is derived from a single probability distribution, the so-called common prior. In the epistemic framework of Definition 3 all beliefs are furnished by the types. The common prior assumption thus imposes a condition on the types, requiring all beliefs to be derived from a single probability distribution on the basic space of uncertainty and the players' types.

Definition 4. Let Γ be a static game, and $\mathcal{M}^\Gamma$ an epistemic model of it. The epistemic model $\mathcal{M}^\Gamma$ satisfies the *common prior assumption*, if there exists a probability measure $\varphi \in \Delta\big(\times_{j\in I}(C_j \times T_j)\big)$ such that for every player $i \in I$, and for every type $t_i \in T_i$ it is the case that $\varphi(t_i) > 0$ and

$$b_i[t_i](c_{-i}, t_{-i}) = \frac{\varphi(c_i, c_{-i}, t_i, t_{-i})}{\varphi(c_i, t_i)}$$

for all $c_i \in C_i$ with $\varphi(c_i, t_i) > 0$, and for all $(c_{-i}, t_{-i}) \in C_{-i} \times T_{-i}$, where $\varphi(t_i) := \sum_{t_{-i}\in T_{-i}} \sum_{c\in\times_{i\in I} C_i} \varphi(c, t_i, t_{-i})$ as well as $\varphi(c_i, t_i) := \sum_{t_{-i}\in T_{-i}} \sum_{c_{-i}\in C_{-i}} \varphi(c_i, c_{-i}, t_i, t_{-i})$. The probability measure φ is called *common prior*.

Accordingly, every type's induced belief function obtains from a single probability measure – the common prior – via Bayesian updating. Note that the common prior is defined on the full space of uncertainty, i.e. on the set of all the players' choice type combinations, while belief functions are defined on the space of respective opponents' choice type combinations only. The common prior assumption could be interpreted by means of an interim stage set-up, in which every player $i \in I$ observes the pair (c_i, t_i) on which he then conditionalizes. Moreover, note that our common prior assumption according to Definition 4 is equivalent to the conjunction of Dekel and Siniscalchi's (2015) Definition 12.13 with their Definition 12.15. In a sense, the common prior assumption is commonly believed by the players in an epistemic model satisfying it, as every type of ever player believes that all types in the epistemic model derive their beliefs from the same prior.

Intuitively, an optimal choice yields at least as much payoff as all other options, given what the player believes his opponents to choose. Formally, optimality is a property of choices given a type. A choice $c_i^* \in C_i$ is said to be *optimal* for the type t_i, if

$$u_i(c_i^*, t_i) \geq u_i(c_i, t_i)$$

for all $c_i \in C_i$.

A player believes in rationality, if he only deems possible choice type pairs – for each of his opponents – such that the choice is optimal for the respective type. Formally, a type $t_i \in T_i$ is said to *believe in rationality*, if t_i only deems possible choice type combinations $(c_{-i}, t_{-i}) \in C_{-i} \times T_{-i}$ such that c_j is optimal for t_j for every opponent $j \in I \setminus \{i\}$. Note that belief in rationality imposes restrictions on the first two layers of a player's belief hierarchy, since the player's belief about his opponents' choices as well as the player's belief about his opponents' beliefs about their respective opponents' choices are affected.

The conditions on interactive reasoning can be taken to further – arbitrarily high – layers in belief hierarchies.

Definition 5. Let Γ be a static game, $\mathcal{M}^\Gamma$ an epistemic model of it, and $i \in I$ some player.

- A type $t_i \in T_i$ expresses 1-*fold belief in rationality*, if t_i believes in rationality.
- A type $t_i \in T_i$ expresses *k-fold belief in rationality* for some $k > 1$, if t_i only deems possible types $t_j \in T_j$ for all $j \in I \setminus \{i\}$ such that t_j expresses $k-1$-fold belief in rationality.
- A type $t_i \in T_i$ expresses *common belief in rationality*, if t_i expresses k-fold belief in rationality for all $k \geq 1$.

A player satisfying common belief in rationality entertains a belief hierarchy in which the rationality of all players is not questioned at any level. Observe that if an epistemic model for every player only contains types that believe in rationality, then every type also expresses common belief in rationality. This fact is useful when constructing epistemic models with types expressing common belief in rationality.

Consider two players $i \in I$ and $j \in I$ not necessarily distinct. A type t_j of player j is called *belief-reachable* from a type t_i of player i, if there exists a finite sequence $(t^1, \ldots, t^N)$ of types with $N \in \mathbb{N}$, where $t^{n+1} \in \text{supp}(b_k[t^n])$ such that $t^n \in T_k$ for all $n \in \{1, \ldots, N-1\}$, and $t^1 = t_i$ as well as $t^N = t_j$. Intuitively, if a type t_j is belief-reachable from a type t_i, the former is not excluded in the interactive reasoning by the latter. The set $T_j(t_i)$ contains all belief-reachable types of player j from t_i. Similarly, a choice type pair $(c_j, t_j) \in C_j \times T_j$ is called *belief-reachable* from t_i, if there exists a finite sequence $(t^1, \ldots, t^N)$ of types with $N \in \mathbb{N}$, where $t^{n+1} \in \text{supp}(b_k[t^n])$ for some $k \in I$ such that $t^n \in T_k$ for all $n \in \{1, \ldots, N-1\}$, $t^1 = t_i$ as well as $t^N = t_j$, and $b_k(t^{N-1})(c_j, t_j) > 0$. The set of belief-reachable choice type pairs of player j from t_i is denoted by $(C_j \times T_j)(t_i)$. Intuitively, if a choice type pair (c_j, t_j) is belief-reachable from a type t_i, the former is not excluded in the interactive reasoning by the latter.

The following lemma ensures that belief reachability preserves common belief in rationality.

Lemma 1. *Let Γ be a static game, $\mathcal{M}^\Gamma$ an epistemic model of it, $i, j \in I$ some players, $t_i \in T_i$ a type of player i, and $t_j \in T_j$ a type of player j. If t_i expresses common belief in rationality and t_j is belief reachable from t_i, then t_j expresses common belief in rationality.*

Proof. Assume that t_j is belief reachable from t_i in $N > 1$ steps, i.e. there exists a finite sequence $(t^1, \ldots, t^N)$ of types with $t^{n+1} \in \text{supp}(b_k[t^n])$ as well as $t^1 = t_i$ and $t^N = t_j$. Towards a contradiction suppose that t_j does not express common belief in rationality. Then, there exists $k > 0$ such that t_j does not express k-fold belief in rationality. However, as t_i deems possible t_j at the N-level of its induced belief hierarchy, t_i thus violates $(N+k)$-fold belief in rationality and a fortiori common belief in rationality, a contradiction. ■

The choice rule of rationality and the reasoning concept of common belief in rationality give rational choice under common belief in rationality. More precisely, a choice $c_i^* \in C_i$ is said to be *rational under common belief in rationality*, if there exists an epistemic model $\mathcal{M}^\Gamma$ of Γ with a type $t_i \in T_i$ of i such that c_i^* is optimal for t_i and t_i expresses common belief in rationality. Similarly, a choice $c_i^* \in C_i$ is said to be *rational under common belief in rationality with a common prior*, if there exists an epistemic model $\mathcal{M}^\Gamma$ of Γ satisfying the common prior assumption with a type $t_i \in T_i$ of i such that c_i^* is optimal for t_i and t_i expresses common belief in rationality. Besides, a first-order belief $\beta_i^* \in \Delta(C_{-i})$ is said to be *possible under common belief in rationality with a common prior*, if there exists an epistemic model $\mathcal{M}^\Gamma$ of Γ satisfying the common prior assumption with a type $t_i \in T_i$ of i such that $b_i[t_i](c_{-i}) = \beta_i^*(c_{-i})$ for all $c_{-i} \in C_{-i}$ and t_i expresses common belief in rationality

5. Epistemic comparison of the two definitions

Before the two solution concepts of correlated equilibrium and canonical correlated equilibrium are contrasted epistemically, the structural relationship between Aumann models and epistemic models is investigated.

On the one hand, epistemic models can be derived from Aumann models as follows.

Definition 6. Let Γ be a static game, and $\mathcal{A}^\Gamma$ an Aumann model of Γ. For every player $i \in I$, construct a set $T_i := \{t_i^{P_i} : P_i \in \mathcal{I}_i\}$, a function $\eta_i : \Omega \to T_i$ such that $\eta_i(\omega) = t_i^{\mathcal{I}_i(\omega)}$ for all $\omega \in \Omega$, a function $b_i : T_i \to \Delta(C_{-i} \times T_{-i})$ such that $b_i[t_i^{P_i}](c_{-i}, t_{-i}) = \sum_{\omega \in P_i : \sigma_{-i}(\omega) = c_{-i}, \eta_{-i}(\omega) = t_{-i}} \pi(\omega \mid P_i)$ for all $(c_{-i}, t_{-i}) \in C_{-i} \times T_{-i}$ and for all $t_i^{P_i} \in T_i$. The epistemic model $\eta(\mathcal{A}^\Gamma)$ of Γ thus obtained is called the $\mathcal{A}^\Gamma$-*induced epistemic model* of Γ.

Accordingly, based on an Aumann model the functions η_i for every player $i \in I$ provide the ingredients for an epistemic model. In particular, these epistemic models satisfy the common prior assumption as will – among other things – be shown below in Theorem 2. Besides, the notation $t_i^{P_i}$ labels the types in the induced epistemic model with the player's information cells from the Aumann model. Thus, by construction, for every cell there exists a type, and vice versa.

Conversely, epistemic models with a common prior also induce Aumann models.

Definition 7. Let Γ be a static game, and $\mathcal{M}^\Gamma$ an epistemic model of Γ satisfying the common prior assumption with common prior φ. Construct a set $\Omega := \{\omega^{(c_i, t_i)_{i \in I}} : c_i \in C_i, t_i \in T_i \text{ for all } i \in I \text{ such that } \varphi((c_i, t_i)_{i \in I}) > 0\}$, a function $\pi \in \Delta(\Omega)$ such that $\pi(\omega^{(c_i, t_i)_{i \in I}}) = \varphi((c_i, t_i)_{i \in I})$ for all $\omega^{(c_i, t_i)_{i \in I}} \in \Omega$, as well as for every player $i \in I$ a function $\sigma_i : \Omega \to C_i$ such that $\sigma_i(\omega^{(c_j, t_j)_{j \in I}}) = c_i$ for all $\omega^{(c_j, t_j)_{j \in I}} \in \Omega$, and a partition $\mathcal{I}_i$ of Ω such that $\mathcal{I}_i(\omega^{(c_j, t_j)_{j \in I}}) = \{\omega^{(c_i, t_i, c'_{-i}, t'_{-i})} \in \Omega : c'_{-i} \in C_{-i}, t'_{-i} \in T_{-i}\}$ for all $\omega^{(c_j, t_j)_{j \in I}} \in \Omega$. The Aumann model $\theta(\mathcal{M}^\Gamma)$ of Γ thus obtained is called the $\mathcal{M}^\Gamma$-*induced Aumann model* of Γ.

In terms of notation a possible world $\omega^{(c_i t_i)_{i \in I}}$ in the induced Aumann model is labelled by a combination of players' choices and types from the epistemic model. This construction ensures that there exists a possible world for every combination of players' choices and types, and vice versa.

Note that given some game Γ, the structure $\eta(\mathcal{A}^\Gamma)$ can be expressed as the image of a function from the collection of all Aumann models of Γ as domain to the collection of all epistemic models of Γ as range, and the structure $\theta(\mathcal{M}^\Gamma)$ can be expressed as the image of a function from the collection of all epistemic models for Γ satisfying the common prior assumption as domain to the collection of all Aumann models of Γ as range.

It is now shown that the transformations between Aumann models and epistemic models connect correlated equilibrium with common belief in rationality and a common prior.

Theorem 2. *Let Γ be a static game.*

(*i*) *Let $\mathcal{A}^\Gamma$ be an Aumann model of Γ, and $\eta(\mathcal{A}^\Gamma)$ be the $\mathcal{A}^\Gamma$-induced epistemic model of Γ. If $(\sigma_i)_{i\in I}$ in $\mathcal{A}^\Gamma$ constitutes a correlated equilibrium, then all types in $\eta(\mathcal{A}^\Gamma)$ express common belief in rationality and $\eta(\mathcal{A}^\Gamma)$ satisfies the common prior assumption.*

(*ii*) *Let $\mathcal{M}^\Gamma$ be an epistemic model of Γ satisfying the common prior assumption, and $\theta(\mathcal{M}^\Gamma)$ be the $\mathcal{M}^\Gamma$-induced Aumann model of Γ. If all types in $\mathcal{M}^\Gamma$ express common belief in rationality, then $(\sigma_i)_{i\in I}$ in $\theta(\mathcal{M}^\Gamma)$ constitutes a correlated equilibrium.*

Proof. For part (*i*) of the theorem, let $\omega \in \Omega$ be some world and $t_i^{\mathcal{I}_i(\omega)}$ some type of some player $i \in I$. Consider some player $j \in I \setminus \{i\}$ and some choice type pair $(c_j, t_j) \in C_j \times T_j$ of player j such that $b_i[t_i^{\mathcal{I}_i(\omega)}](c_j, t_j) > 0$. As

$$b_i[t_i^{\mathcal{I}_i(\omega)}](c_{-i}, t_{-i}) = \sum_{\omega' \in \mathcal{I}_i(\omega): \sigma_{-i}(\omega') = c_{-i}, t_{-i}^{\mathcal{I}_{-i}(\omega')} = t_{-i}} \pi\big(\omega' \mid \mathcal{I}_i(\omega)\big),$$

there exists a world $\omega' \in \mathcal{I}_i(\omega)$ such that $\pi(\omega') > 0$, $\sigma_{-i}(\omega') = c_{-i}$, and $t_{-i}^{\mathcal{I}_{-i}(\omega')} = t_{-i}$. Since $(\sigma_k)_{k\in I}$ constitutes a correlated equilibrium, $\sigma_j(\omega') = c_j$ is optimal for j's first-order belief at ω' which is the same as $t_j^{\mathcal{I}_j(\omega')}$'s first-order belief by construction of $\eta(\mathcal{A}^\Gamma)$. Because $t_j^{\mathcal{I}_j(\omega')} = t_j$, the choice c_j is optimal for t_j's first-order belief and $t_i^{\mathcal{I}_i(\omega)}$ thus believes in j's rationality. As $t_i^{\mathcal{I}_i(\omega)}$ as well as $t_j^{\mathcal{I}_j(\omega')}$ have been chosen arbitrarily, all types in $\eta(\mathcal{A}^\Gamma)$ believe in rationality, and consequently express common belief in rationality too.

Define a probability measure $\varphi \in \Delta\big(\times_{j\in I}(C_j \times T_j)\big)$ such that for all $(c_j, t_j^{P_j})_{j\in I} \in \times_{j\in I}(C_j \times T_j)$

$$\varphi\big((c_j, t_j^{P_j})_{j\in I}\big) := \begin{cases} \pi(\cap_{j\in I} P_j), & \text{if } c_j = \sigma_j(P_j) \text{ for all } j \in I, \\ 0, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

It is now shown that $\eta(\mathcal{A}^\Gamma)$ satisfies the common prior assumption, by establishing that for all $j \in I$ and $t_j^{P_j} \in T_j$, it is the case that

$$b_j[t_j^{P_j}](c_{-j}, t_{-j}^{P_{-j}}) = \frac{\varphi\big(c_j, t_j^{P_j}, c_{-j}, t_{-j}^{P_{-j}}\big)}{\varphi\big(c_j, t_j^{P_j}\big)}$$

for all $c_j \in C_j$ with $\varphi(c_j, t_j^{P_j}) > 0$, and for all $(c_{-j}, t_{-j}^{P_{-j}}) \in C_{-j} \times T_{-j}$. Note that $\varphi(c_j, t_j^{P_j}) > 0$ only holds if $c_j = \sigma_j(P_j)$. It thus has to be established that

$$b_j[t_j^{P_j}](c_{-j}, t_{-j}^{P_j}) = \frac{\varphi\Big(\big(\sigma_j(P_j), t_j^{P_j}\big), (c_{-j}, t_{-j}^{P_j})\Big)}{\varphi\big(\sigma_j(P_j), t_j^{P_j}\big)}$$

for all $(c_{-j}, t_{-j}^{P_{-j}}) \in C_{-j} \times T_{-j}$ and for all $t_j^{P_j} \in T_j$. Consider some $P_j \in \mathcal{I}_j$ and distinguish two cases (*I*) and (*II*).

Case (*I*). Suppose that $P_j \cap (\cap_{k\in I\setminus\{j\}} P_k) \neq \emptyset$ and $c_k = \sigma_k(P_k)$ for all $k \in I \setminus \{j\}$. Observe that

$$\begin{aligned} b_j[t_j^{P_j}](c_{-j}, t_{-j}^{P_{-j}}) &= b_j[t_j^{P_j}](\sigma_{-j}(P_{-j}), t_{-j}^{P_{-j}}) \\ &= \sum_{\omega' \in P_j: \sigma_{-j}(\omega') = c_{-j}, t_{-j}^{\mathcal{I}_{-j}(\omega')} = t_{-j}^{P_{-j}}} \pi(\omega' \mid P_j) \\ &= \sum_{\omega' \in P_j: \omega' \in P_k \text{ for all } k \in I\setminus\{j\}} \pi(\omega' \mid P_j) \\ &= \frac{\pi(\cap_{k\in I} P_k)}{\pi(P_j)} \\ &= \frac{\varphi\big(\sigma_j(P_j), t_j^{P_j}, \sigma_{-j}(P_{-j}), t_{-j}^{P_{-j}}\big)}{\sum_{\hat{P}_{-j} \in \mathcal{I}_{-j}} \pi\big(P_j \cap (\cap_{k\in I\setminus\{j\}} \hat{P}_k)\big)} \\ &= \frac{\varphi\big(\sigma_j(P_j), t_j^{P_j}, \sigma_{-j}(P_{-j}), t_{-j}^{P_{-j}}\big)}{\sum_{\hat{P}_{-j} \in \mathcal{I}_{-j}} \varphi\big(\sigma_j(P_j), t_j^{P_j}, \sigma_{-j}(\hat{P}_{-j}), t_{-j}^{\hat{P}_{-j}}\big)} \\ &= \frac{\varphi\big(\sigma_j(P_j), t_j^{P_j}, \sigma_{-j}(P_{-j}), t_{-j}^{P_{-j}}\big)}{\sum_{(c_{-j}, t_{-j}) \in C_{-j} \times T_{-j}} \varphi\big(\sigma_j(P_j), t_j^{P_j}, c_{-j}, t_{-j}\big)} \\ &= \frac{\varphi\big(\sigma_j(P_j), t_j^{P_j}, \sigma_{-j}(P_{-j}), t_{-j}^{P_{-j}}\big)}{\varphi\big(\sigma_j(P_j), t_j^{P_j}\big)}. \end{aligned}$$

Case (*II*). Suppose that $P_j \cap (\cap_{k\in I\setminus\{j\}} P_k) = \emptyset$ or $c_k \neq \sigma_k(P_k)$ for some $k \in I \setminus \{j\}$. Then,

$$b_j[t_j^{P_j}](c_{-j}, t_{-j}^{P_{-j}}) = 0 = \frac{\varphi\big(\sigma_j(P_j), t_j^{P_j}, c_{-j}, t_{-j}^{P_{-j}}\big)}{\varphi\big(\sigma_j(P_j), t_j^{P_j}\big)}$$

holds by definition. Hence, $\eta(\mathcal{A}^\Gamma)$ satisfies the common prior assumption.

For part (*ii*) of the theorem, let $(c_j, t_j)_{j\in I} \in \times_{j\in I}(C_j \times T_j)$ be some choice type combination of all players such that $\varphi\big((c_j, t_j)_{j\in I}\big) > 0$. Consider the world $\omega^{(c_j,t_j)_{j\in I}} \in \Omega$ in $\theta(\mathcal{M}^\Gamma)$ and a choice $c_i' \in C_i$ of some player $i \in I$. Then,

$$\begin{aligned} &\sum_{\omega' \in \mathcal{I}_i\left(\omega^{(c_j,t_j)_{j\in I}}\right)} \pi\Big(\omega' \mid \mathcal{I}_i\big(\omega^{(c_j,t_j)_{j\in I}}\big)\Big) \cdot U_i\big(c_i', \sigma_{-i}(\omega')\big) \\ &= \sum_{\omega' \in \mathcal{I}_i\left(\omega^{(c_j,t_j)_{j\in I}}\right)} \frac{\pi(\omega')}{\pi\Big(\mathcal{I}_i\big(\omega^{(c_j,t_j)_{j\in I}}\big)\Big)} \cdot U_i\big(c_i', \sigma_{-i}(\omega')\big) \\ &= \sum_{(c_{-i}', t_{-i}') \in C_{-i} \times T_{-i}: \varphi(c_i, t_i, c_{-i}', t_{-i}') > 0} \frac{\varphi(c_i, c_{-i}', t_i, t_{-i}')}{\varphi(c_i, t_i)} \cdot U_i(c_i', c_{-i}') \\ &= \sum_{(c_{-i}', t_{-i}') \in C_{-i} \times T_{-i}: b_i[t_i](c_{-i}', t_{-i}') > 0} b_i[t_i](c_{-i}', t_{-i}') \cdot U_i(c_i', c_{-i}') \\ &= u_i(c_i', t_i), \end{aligned}$$

where the third equality follows from the fact that $\mathcal{M}^\Gamma$ satisfies the common prior assumption with common prior φ. Now, consider some world $\omega^{(c_j,t_j)_{j\in I}} \in \Omega$ and some player $i \in I$. Since $\varphi(c_i, t_i) > 0$, there exists a type $t_j \in T_j$ such that $b_j[t_j](c_i, t_i) > 0$ for some player $j \in I$. As t_j expresses common belief in rationality, t_j believes in i's rationality. Hence

$$u_i(c_i, t_i) \geq u_i(c_i', t_i)$$

for all $c_i' \in C_i$. Because

$$u_i(c_i', t_i) = \sum_{\omega' \in \mathcal{I}_i\left(\omega^{(c_j,t_j)_{j\in I}}\right)} \pi\Big(\omega' \mid \mathcal{I}_i\big(\omega^{(c_j,t_j)_{j\in I}}\big)\Big) \cdot U_i\big(c_i', \sigma_{-i}(\omega')\big)$$

for all $c_i' \in C_i$, and $\sigma_i\big(\omega^{(c_j,t_j)_{j\in I}}\big) = c_i$, it follows that

$$\begin{aligned} &\sum_{\omega' \in \mathcal{I}_i\left(\omega^{(c_j,t_j)_{j\in I}}\right)} \pi\Big(\omega' \mid \mathcal{I}_i\big(\omega^{(c_j,t_j)_{j\in I}}\big)\Big) \cdot U_i\Big(\sigma_i\big(\omega^{(c_j,t_j)_{j\in I}}\big), \sigma_{-i}(\omega')\Big) \\ &= u_i(c_i, t_i) \\ &\geq u_i(c_i', t_i) = \sum_{\omega' \in \mathcal{I}_i\left(\omega^{(c_j,t_j)_{j\in I}}\right)} \pi\Big(\omega' \mid \mathcal{I}_i\big(\omega^{(c_j,t_j)_{j\in I}}\big)\Big) \cdot U_i\big(c_i', \sigma_{-i}(\omega')\big) \end{aligned}$$

holds for all $c_i' \in C_i$, and thus $(\sigma_i)_{i\in I}$ constitutes a correlated equilibrium. ■

In fact, Theorem 2 can be interpreted as a morphism between Aumann models and epistemic models that preserves some notions of optimality of choice and common prior.

An epistemic characterization of correlated equilibrium in terms of common belief in rationality and a common prior ensues as follows.

Theorem 3. *Let Γ be a static game, $i \in I$ some player, $\beta_i^* \in \Delta(C_{-i})$ some first-order belief of player i, and $c_i^* \in C_i$ some choice of player i.*

(*i*) *The first-order belief β_i^* is possible in a correlated equilibrium, if and only if, the first-order belief β_i^* is possible under common belief in rationality with a common prior.*

(*ii*) *The choice c_i^* is optimal in a correlated equilibrium, if and only if, the choice c_i^* is rational under common belief in rationality with a common prior.*

Proof. For the *only if* direction of part (*i*) of the theorem, let $\mathcal{A}^\Gamma$ be an Aumann model of Γ and $(\sigma_j)_{j\in I}$ a correlated equilibrium, in which β_i^* is possible. Then, there exists a world $\hat{\omega} \in \Omega$ such that $\beta_i^*(c_{-i}) = \pi\big(\{\omega' \in \mathcal{I}_i(\hat{\omega}) : \sigma_{-i}(\omega') = c_{-i}\} \mid \mathcal{I}_i(\hat{\omega})\big)$ for all $c_{-i} \in C_{-i}$. Consider the epistemic model $\eta(\mathcal{A}^\Gamma)$ of Γ. By Theorem 2(*i*), the type $t_i^{\mathcal{I}_i(\hat{\omega})}$ expresses common belief in rationality, and the epistemic model $\eta(\mathcal{A}^\Gamma)$ of Γ satisfies the common prior assumption. Note that $b_i[t_i^{\mathcal{I}_i(\hat{\omega})}](c_{-i}, t_{-i}) = \sum_{\omega\in\mathcal{I}_i(\hat{\omega}):\sigma_{-i}(\omega)=c_{-i},\eta_{-i}(\omega)=t_{-i}} \pi\big(\omega \mid \mathcal{I}_i(\hat{\omega})\big)$ for all $(c_{-i}, t_{-i}) \in C_{-i}\times T_{-i}$, and thus $\beta_i^*(c_{-i}) = b_i[t_i^{\mathcal{I}_i(\hat{\omega})}](c_{-i})$ for all $c_{-i} \in C_{-i}$. Therefore, the first-order belief β_i^* is possible under common belief in rationality with a common prior.

For the *if* direction of the part (*i*) of the theorem, suppose that β_i^* is possible under common belief in rationality with a common prior. Thus, there exists an epistemic model $\mathcal{M}^\Gamma$ of Γ with a type $t_i^* \in T_i$ such that t_i^* expresses common belief in rationality, $b_i[t_i^*](c_{-i}) = \beta_i^*(c_{-i})$ for all $c_{-i} \in C_{-i}$, and $\mathcal{M}^\Gamma$ satisfies the common prior assumption. Construct an epistemic model $(\mathcal{M}^\Gamma)' = \big((T_j')_{j\in I}, (b_j')_{j\in I}\big)$ of Γ, where for every player $j \in I$, the set T_j' of types contains those $t_j \in T_j$ from $\mathcal{M}^\Gamma$ such that $t_j \in T_j(t_i^*)$, i.e. t_j is belief-reachable from t_i^*. Note that $(\mathcal{M}^\Gamma)'$ satisfies the common prior assumption, with common prior $\varphi' \in \Delta\big(\times_{j\in I}(C_j \times T_j')\big)$ being $\varphi \in \Delta\big(\times_{j\in I}(C_j \times T_j)\big)$ from $\mathcal{M}^\Gamma$ restricted to, and normalized on, $\times_{j\in I}(C_j \times T_j')$. By Lemma 1, all types in $(\mathcal{M}^\Gamma)'$ express common belief in rationality. It then follows with Theorem 2(*ii*) that $(\sigma_j)_{j\in I}$ constitutes a correlated equilibrium in $\theta\big((\mathcal{M}^\Gamma)'\big)$. As the first-order beliefs of t_i^* are the same in $(\mathcal{M}^\Gamma)$ and $(\mathcal{M}^\Gamma)'$, the first-order belief of t_i^* equals β_i^* also in $(\mathcal{M}^\Gamma)'$. Consider a world $\omega^{(c_i,t_i^*,c_{-i},t_{-i})} \in \Omega$ with $\varphi'(c_i, t_i^*, c_{-i}, t_{-i}) > 0$ for some $c_i \in C_i$, $c_{-i} \in C_{-i}$, and $t_{-i} \in T_{-i}$. Consequently, $\beta_i^*(c_{-i}) = b_i[t_i^*](c_{-i}) = \sum_{t_{-i}\in T_{-i}} \varphi(c_{-i}, t_{-i} \mid c_i, t_i^*) = \pi\Big(\{\omega \in \mathcal{I}_i\big(\omega^{(c_i,t_i^*,c_{-i},t_{-i})}\big) : \sigma_{-i}\big(\omega\big) = c_{-i}\} \mid \mathcal{I}_i\big(\omega^{(c_i,t_i^*,c_{-i},t_{-i})}\big)\Big)$. Therefore, β_i^* is possible in a correlated equilibrium.

For part (*ii*) of the theorem, let $\mathcal{A}^\Gamma$ be an Aumann model of Γ and $(\sigma_j)_{j\in I}$ a correlated equilibrium, in which c_i^* is optimal. Then, there exists some first-order belief $\beta_i^* \in \Delta(C_{-i})$ possible in $\mathcal{A}^\Gamma$ for which c_i^* maximizes expected utility. By part (*i*) of the corollary it then follows that β_i^* is also possible under common belief in rationality with a common prior, and consequently c_i^* is optimal under common belief in rationality with a common prior too. Conversely, let $\mathcal{M}^\Gamma$ be an epistemic model of Γ with a type $t_i^* \in T_i$ such that t_i^* expresses common belief in rationality, c_i^* is optimal for t_i^*, and $\mathcal{M}^\Gamma$ satisfies the common prior assumption. Let $\beta_i^* \in \Delta(C_i)$ be the first-order belief of t_i^*. Then, β_i^* is possible under common belief in rationality with a common prior. By part (*i*) of the corollary it then follows that β_i^* is also possible in a correlated equilibrium, and consequently c_i^* is optimal in a correlated equilibrium too. ■

From an epistemic perspective correlated equilibrium is thus – doxastically and behaviourally – equivalent to common belief in rationality with a common prior. In fact, the epistemic characterization of correlated equilibrium according to Theorem 3 somewhat resembles Dekel and Siniscalchi (2015, Theorem 12.4). However, the two epistemic characterizations differ importantly in the sense that the latter is provided for an ex-ante perspective while the former is furnished for an interim perspective. More precisely, Theorem 3 characterizes the players' (conditionalized) first-order beliefs as well as optimal choices in line with correlated equilibrium, while Dekel and Siniscalchi (2015, Theorem 12.4) focus on the (prior) beliefs corresponding to Aumann's original solution concept. Furthermore, a minor difference lies in the formulation of the epistemic characterization in terms of belief hierarchies (Dekel and Siniscalchi, 2015, Theorem 12.4) as opposed to types (Theorem 3). Note that the conditions used by Dekel and Siniscalchi (2015, Theorem 12.4) as well as by Theorem 3 are weaker than in Aumann (1987), where correlated equilibrium is characterized – also from an ex-ante in contrast to our interim perspective – in terms of universal rationality and a common prior. More precisely, Aumann (1987) assumes that players are rational at all possible worlds, which is stronger than common belief in rationality. Intuitively, in Aumann's (1987) model no irrationality in the system is admitted at all. Besides, Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) characterize a variant of correlated equilibrium without a common prior called a posteriori equilibrium by common knowledge of rationality for the ex-ante stage of the game.

Next canonical correlated equilibrium is considered from an epistemic perspective. Before the solution concept is epistemically characterized, two further doxastic conditions are introduced.

Definition 8. Let Γ be a static game, $\mathcal{M}^\Gamma$ an epistemic model of it, $i, j \in I$ two players, $t_i \in T_i$ some type of player i, $\beta_j \in \Delta(C_{-j})$ some first-order belief of player j, and $c_j \in C_j$ some choice of player j. The type t_i *always explains choice c_j by first-order belief β_j*, if for all $t_j \in T_j$ such that $(c_j, t_j) \in (C_j \times T_j)(t_i)$, it is the case that

$$b_j[t_j](c_{-j}) = \beta_j(c_{-j})$$

for all $c_{-j} \in C_{-j}$.

Accordingly, every given choice deemed possible a reasoner accompanies with the same first-order belief in his entire belief hierarchy. In this sense, throughout his reasoning any given choice is explained in a unique way.

Requiring a player to always explain any choice with a fixed first-order belief gives rise to the notion of one-theory-per-choice, as follows.

Definition 9. Let Γ be a static game, $\mathcal{M}^\Gamma$ an epistemic model of it, $i \in I$ some player, and $t_i \in T_i$ some type of player i. The type t_i holds *one-theory-per-choice*, if for all $j \in I$, and for all $c_j \in C_j$, there exists $\beta_j \in \Delta(C_{-j})$ such that t_i always explains c_j by β_j.

Intuitively, a player reasoning in line with one-theory-per-choice never – i.e. nowhere in his belief hierarchy – uses distinct first-order beliefs ("theories") for any player to explain the same choice of this player. The reasoner does thus not use more theories than necessary in his belief hierarchy, which is in this sense sparse. Besides, note that in Example 2 *Bob*'s belief hierarchy induced at world ω_3 actually violates the one-theory-per-choice condition. Indeed, *Bob* believes with probability $\frac{1}{4}$ that

Alice chooses b while believing him to choose e, but he also believes with probability $\frac{1}{4}$ that *Alice* chooses b while believing him to choose e with probability $\frac{1}{3}$ and g with probability $\frac{2}{3}$.

In fact, the one-theory-per-choice condition contains a rather strong psychological assumption in terms of correct beliefs. Since at no iteration in the full belief hierarchy of a reasoner holding one-theory-per-choice any given choice is coupled with distinct first-order beliefs, the reasoner believes that his opponents are correct about how he explains any choice, he believes that his opponents believe that their opponents are correct about how he explains any choice, etc. Also, the reasoner does not only believe that any opponent only uses a single theory to explain a given choice, but also believes that his other opponents believe so, and that they believe their opponents to believe so, etc. In particular, the following remark thus ensues.

Remark 5. Let Γ be a static game, $\mathcal{M}^\Gamma$ an epistemic model of it, $i \in I$ some player, and $t_i \in T_i$ some type of player i that holds one-theory-per-choice. Consider some player $j \in I$, some choice of player $c_j \in C_j$, and some first-order belief $\beta_j \in \Delta(C_{-j})$ of player j such that t_i always explains c_j by β_j.

(i) For all $k \in I \setminus \{i\}$, for all $t_k \in T_k$ such that $b_i[t_i](t_k) > 0$, and for all $t_i' \in T_i$ such that $b_k[t_k](t_i') > 0$, it is the case that t_i' always explains c_j by β_j.

(ii) For all $l \in I \setminus \{i, j\}$, and for all $t_l \in T_l$ such that $b_i[t_i](t_l) > 0$, it is the case that t_l always explains c_j by β_j.

Accordingly, the one-theory-per-choice condition thus contains two correct beliefs assumptions: a reasoner believes his opponents to be correct about all of his choice explanations as well as projects his choice explanations on any other opponent. It is even the case that common belief in these two properties – or formally in properties (i) and (ii) of Remark 5 – is implied by one-theory-per-choice, as they are taken for certain in all interactive belief iterations.

Besides, a first-order belief $\beta_i \in C_i$ is said to be *possible under common belief in rationality with a common prior and one-theory-per-choice*, if there exists an epistemic model $\mathcal{M}^\Gamma$ of Γ satisfying the common prior assumption with a type $t_i^* \in T_i$ of i such that $b_i[t_i^*](c_{-i}) = \beta_i^*(c_{-i})$ for all $c_{-i} \in C_{-i}$ and t_i^* expresses common belief in rationality as well as holds one-theory-per-choice. Similarly, a choice $c_i^* \in C_i$ is said to be *rational under common belief in rationality with a common prior and one-theory-per-choice*, if there exists an epistemic model $\mathcal{M}^\Gamma$ of Γ satisfying the common prior assumption with a type $t_i^* \in T_i$ of i such that c_i^* is optimal for t_i^* and t_i^* expresses common belief in rationality as well as holds one-theory-per-choice.

An epistemic characterization of canonical correlated equilibrium then ensues as follows.

Theorem 4. *Let Γ be a static game, $i \in I$ some player, $\beta_i^* \in \Delta(C_{-i})$ some first-order belief of player i, and $c_i^* \in C_i$ some choice of player i.*

(i) *The first-order belief β_i^* is possible in a canonical correlated equilibrium, if and only if, the first-order belief β_i^* is possible under common belief in rationality with a common prior and one-theory-per-choice.*

(ii) *The choice c_i^* is optimal in a canonical correlated equilibrium, if and only if, the choice c_i^* is rational under common belief in rationality with a common prior and one-theory-per-choice.*

Proof. For the *only if* direction of part (i) of the theorem, suppose that $\rho \in \Delta(\times_{j \in I} C_j)$ constitutes a canonical correlated equilibrium of Γ. For every $j \in I$ define a type space $T_j := \{t_j^{c_j} : \rho(c_j) > 0\}$ with induced belief function

$$b_j[t_j^{c_j}](c_{-j}, t_{-j}) := \begin{cases} \rho(c_{-j} \mid c_j), & \text{if } t_{-j} = t_{-j}^{c_{-j}}, \\ 0, & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases}$$

for every type $t_j^{c_j} \in T_j$. Also, define a probability measure $\varphi \in \Delta\big((C_j \times T_j)_{j \in I}\big)$ such that

$$\varphi\big((c_j, t_j)_{j \in I}\big) := \begin{cases} \rho\big((c_j)_{j \in I}\big), & \text{if } t_j = t_j^{c_j} \text{ for all } j \in I, \\ 0, & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases}$$

for all $(c_j, t_j)_{j \in I} \in (C_j \times T_j)_{j \in I}$.

Observe that

$$\frac{\varphi(c_j, t_j^{c_j}, c_{-j}, t_{-j}^{c_{-j}})}{\varphi(c_j, t_j^{c_j})} = \frac{\rho\big((c_k)_{k \in I}\big)}{\rho(c_j)} = \rho(c_{-j} \mid c_j) = b_j[t_j^{c_j}](c_{-j}, t_{-j}^{c_{-j}})$$

holds for all $(c_j, t_j^{c_j}) \in C_j \times T_j$, and thus the constructed epistemic model $\big((T_j)_{j \in I}, (b_j)_{j \in I}\big)$ satisfies the common prior assumption with common prior φ.

Next consider some type $t_j^{c_j} \in T_j$ and let $(c_k, t_k), (c_k, t_k') \in (C_k \times T_k)(t_j^{c_j})$ be belief-reachable from $t_j^{c_j}$. By definition of T_k it holds that $t_k = t_k' = t_k^{c_k}$ and thus $b_k[t_k](c_{-k}) = b_k[t_k'](c_{-k})$ trivially holds for all $c_{-k} \in C_{-k}$. Therefore, $t_j^{c_j}$ holds one-theory-per-choice. As $t_j^{c_j}$ has been chosen arbitrarily, all types in T_j hold one-theory-per-choice.

Furthermore, let $(c_k, t_k) \in C_k \times T_k$ such that $b_j[t_j^{c_j}](c_k, t_k) > 0$ for some $t_j^{c_j} \in T_j$. Then, $t_k = t_k^{c_k}$ and $b_k[t_k^{c_k}](c_{-k}) = \rho(c_{-k} \mid c_k)$ holds for all $c_{-k} \in C_{-k}$ as well as $\rho(c_k) > 0$. Since ρ is a canonical correlated equilibrium, c_k is optimal for $\rho(\cdot \mid c_k)$ and consequently optimal for $t_k^{c_k}$ too. Hence, all types believe in rationality and a fortiori all types express common belief in rationality.

Suppose that β_i^* is possible in the canonical correlated equilibrium ρ. Then, there exists some choice $\hat{c}_i \in C_i$ with $\rho(\hat{c}_i) > 0$ such that $\rho(c_{-i} \mid \hat{c}_i) = \beta_i^*(c_{-i})$ for all $c_{-i} \in C_{-i}$. Consider the type $t_i^{\hat{c}_i} \in T_i$, which indeed exists due to $\rho(\hat{c}_i) > 0$, and observe that $b_i[t_i^{\hat{c}_i}](c_{-i}) = \rho(c_{-i} \mid \hat{c}_i) = \beta_i^*(c_{-i})$ for all $c_{-i} \in C_{-i}$. Therefore, the first-order belief β_i^* is possible under common belief in rationality with a common prior and one-theory-per-choice.

For the *if* direction of part (i) of the theorem, let $\mathcal{M}^\Gamma$ be an epistemic model of Γ that satisfies the common prior assumption with common prior $\varphi \in \Delta\big(\times_{j \in I}(C_j \times T_j)\big)$, as well as $t_i^* \in T_i$ be a type such that t_i^* expresses common belief in rationality, holds one-theory-per-choice, and t_i^* holds first-order belief β_i^*. It is shown that β_i^* is possible in a canonical correlated equilibrium.

Consider some choice type pair $(c_j, t_j) \in (C_j \times T_j)(t_i^*)$ of some player $j \in I$ that is belief-reachable from t_i^*. Then, there exists a sequence $(t^1, \ldots, t^N)$ of types such that $t^1 = t_i^*$, $t^N = t_j$, $b_k[t^n](t^{n+1}) > 0$ for all $n \in \{1, \ldots, N-1\}$, for some $k \in I$, and $b_l[t^{N-1}](c_j, t_j) > 0$. As t_i^* expresses $(N-1)$-fold belief in rationality, it directly follows that c_j is optimal for t_j.

Define a probability measure $\rho \in \Delta(\times_{k \in I} C_k)$ by

$$\rho\big((c_k)_{k \in I}\big) := \begin{cases} \frac{\varphi(\times_{k \in I}\{c_k\} \times T_k)}{\varphi\left(\times_{k \in I}(C_k \times T_k)(t_i^*)\right)}, & \text{if } c_k \in C_k(t_i^*) \text{ for all } k \in I, \\ 0, & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases}$$

for all $(c_k)_{k \in I} \in \times_{k \in I} C_k$, where $C_k(t_i^*) := \{c_k \in C_k : (c_k, t_k) \in (C_k \times T_k)(t_i^*) \text{ for some } t_k \in T_k\}$.

Let $\tilde{c}_j \in C_j$ be some choice such that $\rho(\tilde{c}_j) > 0$. Thus, $\tilde{c}_j \in C_j(t_i^*)$ and there exists some type $\tilde{t}_j \in T_j$ such that $(\tilde{c}_j, \tilde{t}_j) \in (C_j \times T_j)(t_i^*)$. Since t_i^* expresses common belief in rationality, it follows, that $\tilde{c}_j$ is optimal for $\tilde{t}_j$. As $\mathcal{M}^\Gamma$ satisfies the common prior assumption, it is the case that

$$b_j[\tilde{t}_j](c_{-j}, t_{-j}) = \frac{\varphi(\tilde{c}_j, \tilde{t}_j, c_{-j}, t_{-j})}{\varphi(\tilde{c}_j, \tilde{t}_j)}$$

holds, and hence

$$b_j[\tilde{t}_j](c_{-j}) = \frac{\varphi(\tilde{c}_j, \tilde{t}_j, \{c_{-j}\} \times T_{-j})}{\varphi(\tilde{c}_j, \tilde{t}_j)}$$

for all $c_{-j} \in C_{-j}$.

Since t_i^* holds one-theory-per-choice, all types in the set $T_j(\tilde{c}_j) := \{t_j' \in T_j : (\tilde{c}_j, t_j') \in (C_j \times T_j)(t_i^*)\}$ have the same first-order belief $\beta_j \in \Delta(C_{-j})$. Consequently, for all $t_j' \in T_j(\tilde{c}_j)$ it is the case that

$$b_j[t_j'](c_{-j}) = \frac{\varphi(\{\tilde{c}_j, t_j'\} \times \{c_{-j}\} \times T_{-j})}{\varphi(\tilde{c}_j, t_j')} = \beta_j(c_{-j})$$

for all $c_{-j} \in C_{-j}$. Then,

$$\rho(c_{-j} \mid \tilde{c}_j) = \frac{\rho(\tilde{c}_j, c_{-j})}{\rho(\tilde{c}_j)} = \frac{\varphi\big(\{\tilde{c}_j\} \times T_j(\tilde{c}_j) \times \{c_{-j}\} \times T_{-j}\big)}{\varphi\big(\{\tilde{c}_j\} \times T_j(\tilde{c}_j)\big)}$$

$$\frac{\sum_{t_j' \in T_j(\tilde{c}_j)} \varphi(\{\tilde{c}_j, t_j'\} \times \{c_{-j}\} \times T_{-j})}{\sum_{t_j' \in T_j(\tilde{c}_j)} \varphi(\tilde{c}_j, t_j')}$$
$$= \frac{\sum_{t_j' \in T_j(\tilde{c}_j)} \beta_j(c_{-j}) \cdot \varphi(\tilde{c}_j, t_j')}{\sum_{t_j' \in T_j(\tilde{c}_j)} \varphi(\tilde{c}_j, t_j')} = \beta_j(c_{-j})$$

for all $c_{-j} \in C_{-j}$. Thus, $\tilde{t}_j$'s first-order belief is $\beta_j = \rho(\cdot \mid \tilde{c}_j)$, and – since $\tilde{c}_j$ is optimal for $\tilde{t}_j$ – it is the case that $\tilde{c}_j$ is optimal for $\rho(\cdot \mid \tilde{c}_j)$. Therefore, ρ is a canonical correlated equilibrium.

Recall that t_i^* holds first-order belief β_i^*. It is shown that β_i^* is possible in the canonical correlated equilibrium ρ. As $\varphi(t_i^*) > 0$, and $\mathcal{M}^\Gamma$ satisfies the common prior assumption, it follows that $(\tilde{c}_i, t_i^*) \in (C_i \times T_i)(t_i^*)$ for some $\tilde{c}_i \in C_i$. In fact, there exists a player $l \in I$ such that $b_i[t_i^*](t_l) > 0$ and $b_l[t_l](\tilde{c}_i, t_i^*) > 0$. Since t_i^* holds one-theory-per-choice, β_i^* is the unique first-order belief attached to $\tilde{c}_i$ in t_i^*'s induced belief hierarchy. As $t_i^* \in T_i(\tilde{c}_i)$, it follows from above that $\beta_i^*(c_{-i}) = b_i[t_i^*](c_{-i}) = \rho(c_{-i} \mid \tilde{c}_i)$ for all $c_{-i} \in C_{-i}$. Consequently, β_i^* is possible in a canonical correlated equilibrium.

For part (*ii*) of the theorem, let ρ be a canonical correlated equilibrium, in which c_i^* is optimal. Then, there exists some first-order belief $\beta_i^* \in \Delta(C_{-i})$ possible in ρ for which c_i^* maximizes expected utility. By part (*i*) of the theorem it then follows that β_i^* is also possible under common belief in rationality with a common prior and one-theory-per-choice, thus c_i^* is optimal under common belief in rationality with a common prior and one one-theory-per-choice too. Conversely, let $\mathcal{M}^\Gamma$ be an epistemic model of Γ with a type $t_i^* \in T_i$ such that t_i^* expresses common belief in rationality, t_i^* holds one-theory-per-choice, c_i^* is optimal for t_i^*, and $\mathcal{M}^\Gamma$ satisfies the common prior assumption. Let β_i^* be t_i^*'s first-order belief. Then, β_i^* is possible under common belief in rationality with a common prior and one-theory-per-choice. By part (*i*) of the theorem it then follows that β_i^* is also possible in a canonical correlated equilibrium, and consequently c_i^* is optimal in a canonical correlated equilibrium too. ■

From an epistemic perspective the solution concept of canonical correlated equilibrium thus is substantially stronger than correlated equilibrium by also requiring the reasoner's thinking to be in line with the one-theory-per-choice condition, which in turn contains a significant correct beliefs assumption.

It can be concluded that correlated equilibrium and canonical correlated equilibrium are distinct solution concepts both behaviourally as well as doxastically. The epistemic characterizations via Theorems 3 and 4 shed light on understanding this difference conceptually. Indeed, canonical correlated equilibrium requires a non-trivial correct beliefs property – the one-theory-per-choice condition – in addition to common belief in rationality and a common prior also used by correlated equilibrium. Since a correct beliefs assumption also constitutes the decisive reasoning property of Nash equilibrium, canonical correlated equilibrium appears to be closer to this solution concept, while correlated equilibrium seems to be more distant from it. Also, canonical correlated equilibrium can thus be seen as a more demanding solution concept than correlated equilibrium in terms of reasoning.

6. Discussion

Solution concepts and epistemic conditions. Before our formal results can be discussed philosophically, it is important to fix an interpretation of the focal objects in general. The relevant objects are the two solution concepts of correlated equilibrium and canonical correlated equilibrium as well as their corresponding epistemic conditions. The meaning of solution concepts and epistemic conditions thus have to be elaborated on.

Solution concepts in game theory are mechanical procedures that give predictions about players' choices. Typically, the input to a solution concept is the specification of a game and the output is a subset of all the players' choice combinations. While being based on implicit intuitive ideas, the actual solution concept itself takes the shape of a black box. Furthermore, solution concepts are not uniformly defined within the same structure. For instance, correlated equilibrium is formulated in Aumann models and imposes a property on choice functions, whereas canonical correlated equilibrium specifies a property for a probability measure on all players' choice combinations. Consequently, due to their opaque character as well as possibly distinct structural embeddings and kinds of output, it is delicate to directly interpret solution concepts in a lucid way.

However, it is possible to indirectly furnish meaning to a solution concept by characterizing it in terms of reasoning. The formal framework of game forms is extended by epistemic models which allow to describe interactive reasoning patterns by means of epistemic conditions. The characterization of a solution concept with epistemic conditions makes explicit its underlying intuitive ideas in a rigorous way. Accordingly, the interpretation of a solution concept is shifted to the epistemic realm. The precise interactive thinking that guides players to choose in line with a solution concept thus constitutes the latter's meaning.

Solution concepts and epistemic conditions thus form a duality. A solution concept and its corresponding epistemic conditions are formally equivalent, yet the former constitutes a mechanic procedure to compute choice profiles while the latter represents interactive reasoning pattern. In a sense, solution concepts could be viewed as the syntax and epistemic conditions as the semantics of a logic of interactive decision-making.

Besides, an epistemic model provides a uniform structure in which solution concepts can be compared via their corresponding epistemic conditions. Such a universal point of reference is especially crucial for perspicuously relating solution concepts that are defined in varying formal frameworks or that generate distinct kinds of output. For instance, to determine whether two solution concepts are equivalent or not their corresponding epistemic conditions can be juxtaposed. Here, this epistemic approach to fathom solution concepts has served to establish that the solution concepts of correlated equilibrium and canonical correlated equilibrium are semantically distinct and do not correspond to the same lines of reasoning.

Ex-ante versus interim. From an ex-ante perspective before any reasoning or decision-making takes place, correlated equilibrium and canonical correlated equilibrium induce the same probability measures on the players' choice combinations. This so-called revelation principle is formally expressed by Theorem 1. Crucially, the ensuing equivalence of correlated equilibrium and canonical correlated equilibrium merely applies to the ex-ante stage of the game.

However, such a prior equivalence is only of limited interest for reasoning and decision-making in games. The posterior beliefs and the optimal choices in line with these posterior beliefs are the pertinent objects for reasoning and decision-making. The two solution concepts have been shown here to differ in terms of both their possible posterior beliefs (Remark 3) as well as their optimal choices (Remark 4), i.e. in terms of both relevant dimensions significant for reasoning and decision-making. The revelation principle does thus no longer hold in the interim stage of the game and in this sense fails to be robust.

Common belief in rationality. The one-theory-per-choice condition does not have any behavioural effect if imposed in addition to common belief in rationality only. Intuitively, if a choice is rational under common belief in rationality, it is well-known that it then survives iterated elimination of strictly dominated choices. It is possible to construct an epistemic model such that there exists a single type for every surviving choice. As for every choice there then exists a unique supporting type, belief in rationality already requires a unique way of coupling opponents' choices and types in the support of a given player's induced belief function. Consequently, the one-theory-per-choice condition holds in such an epistemic model. Therefore, a choice is rational under common belief in rationality, if and only if, it is rational under common belief in rationality with one-theory-per-choice.

Thus, the one-theory-per-choice-condition does not add anything in terms of optimal choice to common belief in rationality. Only if a common prior is also assumed the one-theory-per-choice condition exhibits behavioural implications beyond common belief in rationality resulting in canonical correlated equilibrium and not in iterated elimination of strictly dominated choices.

Common prior assumption. The common prior assumption is present in both Theorems 3 and 4, and thus underlies correlated equilibrium as well as canonical correlated equilibrium. Psychologically, belief hierarchies derived from a common prior can be interpreted as exhibiting a kind of symmetry in the reasoning of the respective player and his opponents. While the existence of a common prior does imply that a player believes that his opponents assign positive probability to his true belief hierarchy, a genuine correct beliefs property of a common prior is not directly apparent. The exploration of belief hierarchies derived from a common prior and any potential correct beliefs properties represents an intriguing question for further research. In any case, Nash equilibrium and canonical correlated equilibrium implicitly assume simple belief hierarchies and one-theory-per-choice, respectively, as correct beliefs properties. Therefore, canonical correlated equilibrium is conceptually closer to Nash equilibrium than correlated equilibrium is to Nash equilibrium, independent of whether the common prior assumption exhibits any correct beliefs flavour, or not.

Besides, note that there exists further solution concept in the literature based on the idea of correlation that entirely dispense with the common prior assumption such as Aumann's (1974) subjective correlated equilibrium and Brandenburger and Dekel's (1987) correlated rationalizability. Our results would suggest that an interim characterization of the former solution concept would maintain common belief in rationality yet weaken the common prior assumption to a subjective prior assumption in the sense that the beliefs of every type of a given player are derived from the same prior. In contrast, correlated rationalizability drops any prior requirement and is simply equivalent to common belief in rationality in terms of reasoning.[5] The key distinction between correlated equilibrium and canonical correlated equilibrium on the one hand and subjective correlated equilibrium and correlated rationalizability on the other hand thus lies in the common prior assumption which the former solution concepts require yet the latter notions lack.

One-theory-per-choice. A player reasoning in line with the epistemic condition of one-theory-per-choice uses for each of his opponents' choices only a single first-order belief in his whole belief hierarchy. In other words, a player never uses two different first-order beliefs to explain the same choice in his whole belief hierarchy. The one-theory-per-choice condition thus keeps a belief hierarchy lean. Such a sparsity condition is similar to Perea's (2012) epistemic notion of simple belief hierarchies, which require a belief hierarchy to be entirely generated by a tuple of first-order beliefs. Since simple belief hierarchies are closely connected to Nash equilibrium and the one-theory-per-choice condition to canonical correlated equilibrium, the resemblance between the two conditions in terms of leanness gives canonical correlated equilibrium some Nash equilibrium flavour, which is absent from correlated equilibrium due to lacking such a leanness condition.

Potentially, the epistemic hypothesis of one-theory-per-choice could shed light on further game theoretic solution concepts such as perfect correlated equilibrium. Dhillon and Mertens (1996) introduce a correlation version of Selten's (1975) notion of perfect equilibrium and show that the revelation principle, i.e. the ex-ante equivalence of perfect correlated equilibrium with a canonical representation of it, actually fails to hold. It would be interesting to investigate whether the one-theory-per-choice condition – or some variant of it – could explain this absence of the revelation principle. Similarly, the idea of one-theory-per-choice might play a role for the revelation principle of correlated equilibrium in more general classes of games, e.g. incomplete information, unawareness, or dynamic games. We leave such questions for possible future research.

Nash equilibrium. The epistemic analysis of Nash equilibrium (e.g. Aumann and Brandenburger, 1995; Perea, 2007; Barelli, 2009; Bach and Tsakas, 2014; Bonanno, 2017; Bach and Perea, 2019) has unveiled a correct beliefs assumption as the decisive epistemic property of Nash equilibrium. In fact, a correct beliefs property also features implicitly in the one-theory-per-choice condition (Remark 5): the reasoner believes that his opponents are correct about his theories, believes that his opponents believe that their opponents are correct about his theories, etc. Thus, canonical correlated equilibrium exhibits some Nash equilibrium flavour, whereas correlated equilibrium does not.

To some extent, the lack of a correct beliefs assumption for correlated equilibrium illustrates its fundamental difference to Nash equilibrium. Intuitively, the former solution concept only requires players to behave optimally given the opponents' choice functions, while the latter necessitates players to behave optimally given the opponents' actual choices.

Nash equilibrium can be characterized by common belief in rationality together with simple belief hierarchies. The correct beliefs assumptions due to simple belief hierarchies and one-theory-per-choice can be compared. As the whole belief hierarchy is generated by a single tuple of first-order beliefs, the condition

[5] In fact, Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) also show that correlated rationalizability coincides with a refinement of subjective correlated equilibrium called a posteriori equilibrium.

of simple belief hierarchies directly implies the one-theory-per-choice condition. However, it is possible in a belief hierarchy satisfying the one-theory-per-choice condition that different choices of some opponent are coupled with types inducing distinct first-order beliefs for that opponent, which is impossible for simple belief hierarchies, as all choices of a player are explained by only a single theory in the reasoner's entire belief hierarchy. Besides, simple belief hierarchies imply independence of the first-order beliefs that they are generated with, which is not necessarily the case with belief hierarchies satisfying the one-theory-per-choice condition. Therefore, if a type holds a simple belief hierarchy, then he also holds one-theory-per-choice, while it is possible that a type holds one-theory-per-choice but no simple belief hierarchy.

The one-theory-per-choice condition thus constitutes a weaker correct beliefs assumption than the simplicity condition. It can then be argued that implausibility criticisms due to implicit correct beliefs properties affect Nash equilibrium stronger than canonical correlated equilibrium.

Besides, correct beliefs inherent in simple belief hierarchies or one-theory-per-choice lies entirely inside the mind of the respective reasoner. In this one-person perspective sense the notion of correctness used here is distinct from the truth axiom (''a proposition is implied by the belief in it''), which is the way correct beliefs is typically understood in philosophy. In fact, the truth axiom cannot be expressed in the one-person perspective type-based epistemic models used here (Definition 3), as a formal notion of state is lacking. In a sense, correct beliefs in terms of simple belief hierarchies and one-theory-per-choice is a subjective property, while the truth axiom embodies an objective correct beliefs trait.

Two distinct solution concepts. The epistemic characterizations of correlated equilibrium (Theorem 3) and canonical correlated equilibrium (Theorem 4) show that the two solution concepts are actually distinct. In addition to common belief in rationality and a common prior, canonical correlated equilibrium also requires a correct beliefs assumption in form of the one-theory-per-choice condition and thus makes stronger epistemic assumption than correlated equilibrium. Intuitively, in a correlated equilibrium a player can justify an opponent's choice with two different first-order beliefs in his reasoning, but not in canonical correlated equilibrium. In classical terms, correlated equilibrium and its simplified variant differ, because two information cells can induce the same choice yet different conditional beliefs for a given player via his choice function in a correlated equilibrium, while two different conditioning events, i.e. two distinct choices, always induce different choices in a canonical correlated equilibrium, as the conditioning events in a canonical correlated equilibrium coincide with those choices that receive positive weight by the probability measure on the players' choice combinations. Hence, canonical correlated equilibrium can be viewed as a special case of correlated equilibrium, where different information cells prescribe different choices. To support a particular first-order belief in a correlated equilibrium it may be crucial to use two information cells inducing the same choice for a given player. There generally thus exists more flexibility to build beliefs in a correlated equilibrium, and to consequently also make choices optimal. To conclude, correlated equilibrium and canonical correlated equilibrium form two distinct solution concepts for games based on the idea of correlation.

Declaration of competing interest

No author associated with this paper has disclosed any potential or pertinent conflicts which may be perceived to have impending conflict with this work. For full disclosure statements refer to https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.05.001.

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