EPICENTER Spring Course on Epistemic Game Theory
Chapters 2 and 3: Common Belief in Rationality

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Welcome

- *EPICENTER:* Christian Bach, Bilge Baser, Rubén Becerril, Stephan Jagau, Angie Mounir, Niels Mourmans, Christian Nauerz, Elias Tsakas, Andrés Perea
- Book
- Exercises
- Exam: Monday June 26, 9.00 - 12.00
  Advanced topics will not be part of the exam
- Old exams
- Certificates
- Attendance lists
- Slides
- Wifi
- Coffee and tea
- Lunch

City walk

- City walk: Saturday June 17, 11.00 am at main entrance of this building
- After the walk: Lunch in my favorite café D'n Ingel
- Please indicate which dishes you prefer for the lunch
- Enjoy the course!

What is game theory about?

- In game theory, we study situations where you must make a choice, but where the final outcome also depends on the choices of others.
- Examples are everywhere:
- Negotiating about the price of a car,
- choosing a marketing strategy for your firm,
- bidding in an auction,
- discussing with your partner about what TV program to watch this evening.
- Key question: What choice would you make, and why?
- This depends crucially on how you reason about the opponent!

Example: Going to a party

blue	green	red	yellow	same color as Barbara
4	3	2	1	0

Story

- This evening, you are going to a party together with your friend Barbara.
- You must both decide which color to wear: blue, green, red or yellow.
- Your preferences for wearing these colors are as in the table. These numbers are called utilities.
- You dislike wearing the same color as Barbara: If you both would wear the same color, your utility would be 0.
- What color should you choose, and why?

blue	green	red	yellow	same color as Barbara
4	3	2	1	0

- What color is optimal for you depends on your belief about Barbara's choice:
- If you believe that Barbara wears blue, then green is optimal for you.
- If you believe that Barbara wears green, then blue is optimal for you.
- If you believe that Barbara wears red, then blue is optimal for you.
- If you believe that Barbara wears yellow, then blue is optimal for you.
- We call blue and green rational choices for you, because they are optimal for some belief about Barbara's choice.
- Does this mean that red and yellow are irrational for you?

blue	green	red	yellow	same color as Barbara
4	3	2	1	0

- Suppose you believe that, with probability 0.6, Barbara chooses blue, and that, with probability 0.4, she chooses green.
- If you would choose blue, your expected utility would be $(0.6) \cdot 0 + (0.4) \cdot 4 = 1.6$.
- If you would choose green, your expected utility would be $(0.6) \cdot 3 + (0.4) \cdot 0 = 1.8$.
- If you would choose red, your utility would be 2.
- If you would choose yellow, your utility would be 1.
- So, choosing red is optimal for you if you hold this probabilistic belief about Barbara's choice. In particular, red is a rational choice for you.

blue	green	red	yellow	same color as Barbara
4	3	2	1	0

- Choosing yellow can never be optimal for you, even if you hold a probabilistic belief about Barbara's choice.
- If you assign probability less than 0.5 to Barbara's choice blue, then by choosing blue yourself, your expected utility will be at least $(0.5) \cdot 4 = 2$.
- If you assign probability at least 0.5 to Barbara's choice blue, then by choosing green yourself your expected utility will be at least $(0.5) \cdot 3 = 1.5$.
- Hence, whatever your belief about Barbara, you can always guarantee an expected utility of at least 1.5.
- So, yellow can never be optimal for you, and is therefore an irrational choice for you.

Beliefs diagram

blue	green	red	yellow	same color as Barbara
4	3	2	1	0

Your choices Barbara's choices





- The choices blue, green and red are rational for you.
- But are all of these choices also reasonable? This depends on Barbara's preferences!

	blue	green	red	yellow	same color as friend
you	4	3	2	1	0
Barbara	2	1	4	3	0

- For Barbara, the choices red, yellow and blue are rational, whereas green is irrational.
- Choosing red is optimal for her if she believes that you choose yellow.
- Choosing yellow is optimal for her if she believes that you choose red.
- Choosing blue is optimal for her is she believes that, with probability 0.6, you choose red, and with probability 0.4 you choose yellow.

	blue	green	red	yellow	same color as friend
you	4	3	2	1	0
Barbara	2	$\times$	4	3	0

- If you believe that Barbara chooses rationally, you believe that Barbara will choose red, yellow or blue.
- But then, choosing red will no longer be optimal for you, as choosing green will always be better in this case.
- Choosing blue is optimal for you if you believe that Barbara rationally chooses red.
- Choosing green is optimal for you if you believe that Barbara rationally chooses blue.

Beliefs diagram



	blue	green	red	yellow	same color as friend
you	4	3	2	1	0
Barbara	2	1	4	3	0

- The color yellow is irrational for you.
- The color red is rational for you, but you can no longer rationally choose it if you believe that Barbara chooses rationally.
- If you believe that Barbara chooses rationally, you can still rationally choose the colors blue and green.
- But are both blue and green reasonable choices for you?



- Consider the belief hierarchy that starts at your choice blue:
- You believe that Barbara chooses red.
- You believe that Barbara believes that you choose yellow.
- You believe that Barbara believes that you choose irrationally (yellow), so this belief hierarchy is not reasonable.



- In this alternative beliefs diagram, consider the belief hierarchy that starts at your choice blue.
- You believe that Barbara rationally chooses red.
- You believe that Barbara believes that you rationally choose blue.
- You believe that Barbara believes that you believe that Barbara rationally chooses red. And so on.



- The belief hierarchy that supports your choice blue expresses common belief in rationality.
- So, you can rationally choose blue under common belief in rationality!



- What about your choice green? Consider the belief hierarchy that starts at your choice green.
- You believe that Barbara chooses blue.
- You believe that Barbara believes that, with probability 0.6, you choose red, and with probability 0.4 you irrationally choose yellow.
- It does not express common belief in rationality.

	blue	green	red	yellow	same color as friend
you	4	3	2	×	0
Barbara	2	1	4	3	0

- In fact, you cannot rationally choose green under common belief in rationality:
- If Barbara believes that you choose rationally, then she believes that you will not choose yellow.
- But then, she cannot rationally choose blue, as yellow would always be better for her.
- So, if you believe that Barbara chooses rationally, and that Barbara believes that you choose rationally, you must believe that she will only choose red or yellow.
- But then, you should choose blue, and not green.

	blue	green	red	yellow	same color as friend
you	4	3	2	1	0
Barbara	2	1	4	3	0

Summarizing

- Your choice yellow is irrational.
- Your choice red is rational, but can no longer be optimal if you believe that Barbara chooses rationally.
- You can rationally choose green if you believe that Barbara chooses rationally, but not if you believe, in addition, that Barbara believes that you choose rationally.
- You can rationally choose blue under common belief in rationality. In fact, blue is the only color you can rationally choose under common belief in rationality.

New Scenario

- Barbara has same preferences over colors as you.
- Barbara likes to wear the same color as you, whereas you dislike this.

	blue	green	red	yellow	same color as friend
you	4	3	2	1	0
Barbara	4	3	2	1	5

- Which color(s) can you rationally choose under common belief in rationality?

Beliefs diagram



	blue	green	red	yellow	same color as friend
you	4	3	2	1	0
Barbara	4	3	2	1	5



- The belief hierarchy that starts at your choice blue expresses common belief in rationality.
- Similarly, the belief hierarchies that start at your choices green and red also express common belief in rationality.
- So, you can rationally choose blue, green and red under common belief in rationality.

Choosing rationally

We will now define formally what we mean by a rational choice.

- $I = \{1, 2, ..., n\}$: set of players.
- C_i: set of choices for player i.
- A choice-combination for i's opponents is a combination $(c_1, ..., c_{i-1}, c_{i+1}, ..., c_n)$.
- By C_{-i} we denote the set of all choice-combinations for i's opponents.
- A belief for player i about his opponents' choices is a probability distribution b_i over the set C_{-i} of opponents' choice-combinations.
- For every choice-combination $c_{-i} \in C_{-i}$, the number $b_i(c_{-i})$ specifies the probability that player i assigns to the event that his opponents make precisely this combination of choices.

- A utility function for player i is a function u_i that assigns to every combination of choices $(c_1, ..., c_n)$ some number $u_i(c_1, ..., c_n)$.
- The number $u_i(c_1, ..., c_n)$ indicates how desirable player i finds the outcome induced by $(c_1, ..., c_n)$.

- In the example "Going to a party":
- $u_1(green, red) = 3$,
- $u_1(green, blue) = 3$,
- $u_1(green, green) = 0$,
- $u_1(blue, red) = 4$.

- Suppose that player i holds a belief b_i about the opponents' choices.
- The expected utility of making choice c_i, while having the belief b_i, is

$$u_i(c_i, b_i) = \sum_{c_{-i} \in C_{-i}} b_i(c_{-i}) \cdot u_i(c_i, c_{-i}).$$

- The choice c_i is optimal for player i given his belief b_i, if

$$u_i(c_i, b_i) \geq u_i(c_i', b_i)$$

for all other choices $c_i' \in C_i$.

- The choice c_i is rational for player i if it is optimal for some belief b_i about the opponents' choices.

Belief hierarchies

- A first-order belief is a belief about an opponent's choice.
- In order to judge whether a first-order belief about player j's choice is reasonable, you must also hold
- a belief about what j believes about his opponents' choices: second-order belief.
- In order to judge whether this second-order belief is reasonable, you must also hold
- a belief about what j believes about what the others believe about their opponents' choices: third-order belief.
- And so on.
- This yields a belief hierarchy.
- Belief hierarchies can be constructed from an extended beliefs diagram.

Extended beliefs diagram



Epistemic model

- Writing down a belief hierarchy explicitly is impossible. You must write down
- your belief about the opponents' choices
- your belief about what your opponents believe about their opponents' choices,
- a belief about what the opponents believe that their opponents believe about the other players' choices,
- and so on, ad infinitum.
- Is there an easy way to encode a belief hierarchy?



Even writing down the first three levels of the belief hierarchy that starts at your choice red is a nightmare!

- A belief hierarchy for you consists of a first-order belief, a second-order belief, a third-order belief, and so on.

- In a belief hierarchy, you hold a belief about
- the opponents' choices,
- the opponents' first-order beliefs,
- the opponents' second-order beliefs,
- and so on.

- Hence, in a belief hierarchy you hold a belief about
- the opponents' choices, and the opponents' belief hierarchies.

- Call a belief hierarchy a type.
- Then, a type holds a belief about the opponents' choices and the opponents' types.



- Denote by t_1^{red} your belief hierarchy that starts at your choice red.
- Denote by t_2^{blue} and t_2^{green} the belief hierarchies for Barbara that start at her choices blue and green.
- Then, t_1^{red} believes that, with prob. 0.6, Barbara chooses blue and has belief hierarchy t_2^{blue}, and believes that, with prob. 0.4, Barbara chooses green and has belief hierarchy t_2^{green}.



- Formally: We call the belief hierarchies t_1^{red}, t_2^{blue} and t_2^{green} types.
- Type t_1^{red} has belief

$$b_1(t_1^{red}) = (0.6) \cdot (blue, t_2^{blue}) + (0.4) \cdot (green, t_2^{green}).$$



- Also, $b_1(t_1^{blue}) = (green, t_2^{green})$ and $b_1(t_1^{green}) = (blue, t_2^{blue})$ and finally $b_1(t_1^{yellow}) = (yellow, t_2^{yellow})$.
- We can do the same for Barbara's belief hierarchies. This leads to an epistemic model.

Epistemic model for "Going to a party"

Types	$T_1 = \{t_1^{blue}, t_1^{green}, t_1^{red}, t_1^{yellow}\}$ $T_2 = \{t_2^{blue}, t_2^{green}, t_2^{red}, t_2^{yellow}\}$
Beliefs for player 1	$b_1(t_1^{blue}) = (green, t_2^{green})$ $b_1(t_1^{green}) = (blue, t_2^{blue})$ $b_1(t_1^{red}) = (0.6) \cdot (blue, t_2^{blue}) + (0.4) \cdot (green, t_2^{green})$ $b_1(t_1^{yellow}) = (yellow, t_2^{yellow})$
Beliefs for player 2	$b_2(t_2^{blue}) = (blue, t_1^{blue})$ $b_2(t_2^{green}) = (green, t_1^{green})$ $b_2(t_2^{red}) = (red, t_1^{red})$ $b_2(t_2^{yellow}) = (yellow, t_1^{yellow})$

- In an epistemic model, we can derive for every type the first-order belief, second-order belief, and so on.
- So, we can derive for every type the complete belief hierarchy .

Types	$T_1 = \{t_1^{blue}, t_1^{green}, t_1^{red}, t_1^{yellow}\}$ $T_2 = \{t_2^{blue}, t_2^{green}, t_2^{red}, t_2^{yellow}\}$
Beliefs for player 1	$b_1(t_1^{blue}) = (green, t_2^{green})$ $b_1(t_1^{green}) = (blue, t_2^{blue})$ $b_1(t_1^{red}) = (0.6) \cdot (blue, t_2^{blue}) + (0.4) \cdot (green, t_2^{green})$ $b_1(t_1^{yellow}) = (yellow, t_2^{yellow})$
Beliefs for player 2	$b_2(t_2^{blue}) = (blue, t_1^{blue})$ $b_2(t_2^{green}) = (green, t_1^{green})$ $b_2(t_2^{red}) = (red, t_1^{red})$ $b_2(t_2^{yellow}) = (yellow, t_1^{yellow})$

Definition (Epistemic model)

An epistemic model specifies for every player i a set T_i of possible types.

Moreover, for every type t_i it specifies a probabilistic belief $b_i(t_i)$ over the set $C_{-i} \times T_{-i}$ of opponents' choice-type combinations.

- Here, $C_{-i} \times T_{-i}$ is the set of combinations

$$((c_1, t_1), \ldots, (c_{i-1}, t_{i-1}), (c_{i+1}, t_{i+1}), \ldots, (c_n, t_n))$$

of opponents' choices and opponents' types.

- For every such combination $(c_{-i}, t_{-i}) \in C_{-i} \times T_{-i}$, the probability

$$b_i(t_i)(c_{-i}, t_{-i})$$

represents the probability that type t_i assigns to the event that the opponents choose c_{-i} and that the opponents' belief hierarchies are given by t_{-i}.

Common belief in rationality

- Intuitively, common belief in rationality means that
- you believe that your opponents choose rationally,
- you believe that your opponents believe that their opponents choose rationally,
- and so on, ad infinitum.
- How can we state common belief in rationality formally, within an epistemic model?



- Your type t_1^{red} has belief $b_1(t_1^{red}) = (0.6) \cdot (blue, t_2^{blue}) + (0.4) \cdot (green, t_2^{green})$.
- For Barbara, blue is optimal for type t_2^{blue}, and green is optimal for type t_2^{green}.
- So, type t_1^{red} only assigns positive probability to choice-type pairs for Barbara where the choice is optimal for the type.
- We say that t_1^{red} believes in Barbara's rationality.

Definition (Belief in the opponents' rationality)

Type t_i believes in the opponents' rationality if his belief $b_i(t_i)$ only assigns positive probability to choice-type combinations

$$((c_1, t_1), ..., (c_{i-1}, t_{i-1}), (c_{i+1}, t_{i+1}), ..., (c_n, t_n))$$

where choice c_1 is optimal for type t_1, ..., choice c_n is optimal for type t_n.

Definition (Common belief in rationality)

Type t_i expresses 1-fold belief in rationality if t_i believes in the opponents' rationality.

Type t_i expresses 2-fold belief in rationality if t_i only assigns positive probability to opponents' types that express 1-fold belief in rationality.

Type t_i expresses 3-fold belief in rationality if t_i only assigns positive probability to opponents' types that express 2-fold belief in rationality.

And so on.

Type t_i expresses common belief in rationality if t_i expresses k-fold belief in rationality for all k.

In the literature, this concept is also known as rationalizability.

Definition

Player i can rationally make choice c_i under common belief in rationality if there is some epistemic model, and some type t_i within this epistemic model, such that

type t_i expresses common belief in rationality, and

choice c_i is optimal for type t_i.

Theorem (Sufficient condition for common belief in rationality)

Consider an epistemic model in which all types believe in the opponents' rationality.

Then, all types in the epistemic model express common belief in rationality.

- Proof: Show that every type expresses k-fold belief in rationality, for all k.
- Every type expresses 1-fold belief in rationality.
- Since a type can only assign positive probability to other types in the same model, every type expresses 2-fold belief in rationality.
- But then, every type also expresses 3-fold belief in rationality.
- And so on.
- Hence, all types express common belief in rationality. ■

	blue	green	red	yellow	same color as friend
you	4	3	2	1	0
Barbara	4	3	2	1	5

Types	$T_1 = \{t_1^{blue}, t_1^{green}, t_1^{red}\}$ $T_2 = \{t_2^{blue}, t_2^{green}, t_2^{red}\}$
Beliefs for player 1	$b_1(t_1^{blue}) = (green, t_2^{green})$ $b_1(t_1^{green}) = (blue, t_2^{blue})$ $b_1(t_1^{red}) = (0.6) \cdot (blue, t_2^{blue}) + (0.4) \cdot (green, t_2^{green})$
Beliefs for player 2	$b_2(t_2^{blue}) = (blue, t_1^{blue})$ $b_2(t_2^{green}) = (green, t_1^{green})$ $b_2(t_2^{red}) = (red, t_1^{red})$

- Every type believes in the opponent's rationality.
- Hence, every type expresses common belief in rationality.

Algorithm

- We look for an algorithm that helps us find those choices you can rationally make under common belief in rationality.
- Start with more basic question: Can we characterize those choices that are rational – that is, optimal for some belief?

- Consider the example "Going to a party".

blue	green	red	yellow	same color as Barbara
4	3	2	1	0

- Only your choice yellow is irrational.
- Your choice yellow is strictly dominated by the randomized choice in which you choose blue and green with probability 0.5.

	blue	green	red	yellow
yellow	1	1	1	0
randomized choice	1.5	2	3.5	3.5

- In the example "Going to a party " we see the following:
- A choice is irrational precisely when it is strictly dominated by another choice, or strictly dominated by a randomized choice.
- In fact, this is always true!

Theorem (Pearce's Lemma)

A choice is irrational, if and only if, it is strictly dominated by another choice, or strictly dominated by a randomized choice.

- Or, equivalently:

Theorem (Pearce's Lemma)

A choice is rational, if and only if, it is not strictly dominated by another choice, nor strictly dominated by a randomized choice.

- Formally, a choice c_i is strictly dominated by a choice c_i' if

$$u_i(c_i, c_{-i}) < u_i(c_i', c_{-i})$$

for every opponents' choice-combination c_{-i}.

- A randomized choice for player i is a probability distribution r_i over his set of choices C_i.

- A choice c_i is strictly dominated by a randomized choice r_i if

$$u_i(c_i, c_{-i}) < u_i(r_i, c_{-i})$$

for every opponents' choice-combination c_{-i}.

Step 1: 1-fold belief in rationality

- Which choices are rational for a type that expresses 1-fold belief in rationality?
- If you believe in the opponents' rationality, then you assign positive probability only to opponents' choices that are rational.
- Remember: A choice is rational precisely when it is not strictly dominated.
- So, if you believe in the opponents' rationality, then you assign positive probability only to opponents' choices that are not strictly dominated.

Step 1: 1-fold belief in rationality

- So, if you believe in the opponents' rationality, then you assign positive probability only to opponents' choices that are not strictly dominated.
- In a sense, you eliminate the opponents' strictly dominated choices from the game, and concentrate on the reduced game that remains.
- The choices that you can rationally make if you believe in your opponents' rationality, are exactly the choices that are optimal for you for some belief within this reduced game.
- But these are exactly the choices that are not strictly dominated for you within this reduced game.
- Hence, these are the choices that survive 2-fold elimination of strictly dominated choices.

Step 2: Up to 2-fold belief in rationality

- Which choices are rational for a type that expresses up to 2-fold belief in rationality?
- Consider a type t_i that expresses up to 2-fold belief in rationality. Then, t_i only assigns positive probability to opponents' choice-type pairs (c_j, t_j) where c_j is optimal for t_j, and t_j expresses 1-fold belief in rationality.
- So, type t_i only assigns positive probability to opponents' choices c_j which are optimal for a type that expresses 1-fold belief in rationality.
- Hence, type t_i only assigns positive probability to opponents' choices c_j which survive 2-fold elimination of strictly dominated choices.

Step 2: Up to 2-fold belief in rationality

- Hence, type t_i only assigns positive probability to opponents' choices c_j which survive 2-fold elimination of strictly dominated choices.
- Then, every choice c_i which is optimal for t_i must be optimal for some belief within the reduced game obtained after 2-fold elimination of strictly dominated choices.
- So, every choice c_i which is optimal for t_i must not be strictly dominated within the reduced game obtained after 2-fold elimination of strictly dominated choices.
- Conclusion: Every choice that is optimal for a type that expresses up to 2-fold belief in rationality, must survive 3-fold elimination of strictly dominated choices.

Algorithm (Iterated elimination of strictly dominated choices)

Step 1. *Within the original game, eliminate all choices that are strictly dominated.*

Step 2. *Within the reduced game obtained after step 1, eliminate all choices that are strictly dominated.*

Step 3. *Within the reduced game obtained after step 2, eliminate all choices that are strictly dominated.*

$\vdots$

Continue in this fashion until no further choices can be eliminated.

Theorem (Algorithm "works")

(1) For every $k \geq 1$, the choices that are optimal for a type that expresses up to k-fold belief in rationality are exactly those choices that survive $(k+1)$-fold elimination of strictly dominated choices.

(2) The choices that can rationally be made under common belief in rationality are exactly those choices that survive iterated elimination of strictly dominated choices.

Properties of the algorithm

Algorithm (Iterated elimination of strictly dominated choices)

Step 1. *Within the original game, eliminate all choices that are strictly dominated.*

Step 2. *Within the reduced game obtained after step 1, eliminate all choices that are strictly dominated.*

Step 3. *Within the reduced game obtained after step 2, eliminate all choices that are strictly dominated.*

$\vdots$

Continue in this fashion until no further choices can be eliminated.

- This algorithm always stops after finitely many steps.
- It always yields a nonempty output for every player.
- The order and speed by which you eliminate choices is not relevant for the eventual output.

Theorem (Algorithm "works")

(1) For every $k \geq 1$, the choices that are optimal for a type that expresses up to k-fold belief in rationality are exactly those choices that survive $(k+1)$-fold elimination of strictly dominated choices.

(2) The choices that can rationally be made under common belief in rationality are exactly those choices that survive iterated elimination of strictly dominated choices.

- Proof of part (2):
- We have shown: If a choice can rationally be made under common belief in rationality, then it must survive iterated elimination of strictly dominated choices.

- We now show the converse: If a choice survives iterated elimination of strictly dominated choices, then it can rationally be made under common belief in rationality.
- Assume two players. Suppose that the algorithm terminates after K steps. Let C_i^K be the set of surviving choices for player i.
- Then, every choice in C_i^K is not strictly dominated within reduced game Γ^K. Hence, every choice c_i in C_i^K is optimal for some belief $b_i^{c_i} \in \Delta(C_j^K)$.
- Define set of types $T_i = \{t_i^{c_i} : c_i \in C_i^K\}$ for both players i.
- Every type $t_i^{c_i}$ only deems possible opponents' choice-type pairs $(c_j, t_j^{c_j})$, with $c_j \in C_j^K$, and

$$b_i(t_i^{c_i})(c_j, t_j^{c_j}) := b_i^{c_i}(c_j).$$

- Then, every type $t_i^{c_i}$ believes in the opponents' rationality.
- Hence, every type expresses common belief in rationality. ■

Corollary (Common belief in rationality is always possible)

We can always construct an epistemic model in which all types express common belief in rationality.

Example: Guessing two-thirds of the average

Story

- All students in this room must write a number on a piece of paper, between 1 and 100.
- The closer you are to two-thirds of the average of all numbers, the higher your prize money.

- What number(s) could you have rationally written down under common belief in rationality?
- Apply the algorithm of "iterated elimination of strictly dominated choices".
- Step 1: What numbers are strictly dominated?
- Two-thirds of the average can never be above 67.
- Hence, every number above 67 is strictly dominated by 67.
- Eliminate all numbers above 67.

- Step 2: Consider the reduced game Γ^1 in which only the numbers $1, ..., 67$ remain for all students.
- Which numbers are strictly dominated in Γ^1 ?
- Two-thirds of the average of all numbers in Γ^1 can never be above $\frac{2}{3} \cdot 67 \approx 45$.
- All numbers above 45 are strictly dominated in Γ^1.
- Eliminate all numbers above 45.
- And so on.
- Only the number 1 remains at the end.
- Under common belief in rationality, you must choose number 1.
- Would you really choose this number? Why?