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ECON915 Microeconomic Theory Part A: Introduction to Decision Theory Lecture 2: Utility

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ECON915 Part A Decision Theory - Lecture 2: Utility

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Introduction	
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The Idea of Utility Representation

- It is of interest to have a numerical representation of preferences.
- A function $U : X \to \mathbb{R}$ is said to represent the preference relation $\succ \subseteq X \times X$, whenever

$$x \succ y$$

if and only if

U(x) > U(y)

holds for all $x, y \in X$.

■ A function U representing preferences > is called a utility function, and > is said to have a utility representation.

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Decision Theory without Utility?

- It is possible to avoid the notion of utility and to construct a theory of decisions based on preferences only.
- Yet, typically utility functions are used rather than preferences to describe an agents's attitude towards alternatives.
- In fact, it is often perceived as more convenient to maximize a numerical function to find the best alternatives for an agent.

Existence of a Utility Representation

- If any preference relation could be represented by a utility function, then utility functions could be used rather than preference relations with no loss of generality.
- Utility Theory investigates the possibility of using a numerical function to represent a preference relation and the possibility of numerical representations carrying additional meaning.
- For instance, x is preferred to y more than a is preferred to b.
- The basic question of utility theory: Under what assumptions do utility representations exist?

Agenda

Multiplicity of Utility Functions

Existence with Finite Sets of Alternatives

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Multiplicity of Utility Functions

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Preference Relations and Utility Functions

- When defining a preference relation from a given utility function, the function has an intuitive meaning that carries with it additional information.
- In contrast, when a utility function is formed to represent a given preference relation, the function has no meaning other than that of representing a preference relation.
- In the latter case, absolute numbers are meaningless, only the relative order is meaningful.
- Indeed, if a preferene relation has a utility representation, then it has an infinite number of such representations.

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Multiplicity of Utility Representations

Alternatively phrased, an utility function is ony unique up to a strictly increasing transformation.

Proposition 4

Let $U: X \to \mathbb{R}$ be a utility function of some strict preference relation $\succ \subseteq X \times X$, and $f: \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}$ be some strictly increasing function. Then, the function

 $V:X \to \mathbb{R}$

such that

$$V(x) := f(U(x))$$

for all $x \in X$ also represents \succ .

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Proof

Observe that for all $x, y \in X$ it is the case that

 $x \succ y$,

if and only if,

U(x) > U(y) (since *U* represents \succ),

if and only if,

f(U(x)) > f(U(y)) (since *f* is strictly increasing),

if and only if,

V(x) > V(y) (by definition of *V*).

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Representation Theorem for Finite Sets

Proposition 5

Let *X* be a finite set. A binary relation $\succ \subseteq X \times X$ is a strict preference relation, if and only if, there exists a function $U : X \to \mathbb{R}$ such that for all $x, y \in X$ it is the case that

$$x \succ y$$
,

if and only if,

U(x) > U(y).

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Restrictions of Strict Preference Relations are Strict Preference Relations

Lemma 2

Let *X* be a finite set, $\succ \subseteq X \times X$ be some strict preference relation on *X*, $Y \subseteq X$ be some subset of *X*, and \succ^Y be the binary relation \succ restricted to $Y \times Y$. Then, \succ^Y is a strict preference relation on *Y*.

Proof:

- Consider $a, b \in Y$ such that $a \succ^Y b$. Then, $a \succ b$ by definition of \succ^Y . By asymmetry of \succ it follows that $b \neq a$. Again, by definition of \succ^Y , it obtains that $b \neq^Y a$. Thus, \succ^Y is asymmetric.
- Consider $a, b, c \in Y$ such that $a \not\prec^Y b$ and $b \not\prec^Y c$. Then, $a \not\prec b$ and $b \not\prec c$ by definition of \succ^Y . By negative transitivity of \succ it follows that $a \not\prec c$. Again, by definition of \succ^Y , it obtains that $a \not\prec^Y c$. Thus, \succ^Y is negative transitive.

Restrictions of Weak Preference Relations are Weak Preference Relations

Lemma 3

Let *X* be a finite set, $\succeq \subseteq X \times X$ be some weak preference relation on *X*, $Y \subseteq X$ be some subset of *X*, and \succeq^Y be the binary relation \succeq restricted to $Y \times Y$. Then, \succeq^Y is a weak preference relation on *Y*.

Proof:

- Consider $a, b \in Y$. Then, $a \succeq b$ or $b \succeq a$ by completeness of \succeq . By definition of \succeq^Y , it directly follows that $a \succeq^Y b$ or $b \succeq^Y a$, hence \succ^Y is complete.
- Consider $a, b, c \in Y$ such that $a \succeq^Y b$ and $b \succeq^Y c$. Then, $a \succeq b$ and $b \succeq c$ by definition of \succeq^Y . By transitivity of \succeq it follows that $a \succeq c$. Again, by definition of \succeq^Y , it obtains that $a \succeq^Y c$. Thus, \succeq^Y is transitive.

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Existence with Finites Set of Alternatives

Existence of Minimal Elements

Lemma 4

Let *X* be a finite set, and $\succeq \subseteq X \times X$ be some weak preference relation on *X*. Then, there exists a minimal element, i.e. $a \in X$ such that $x \succeq a$ for all $x \in X$.

Proof of Lemma 4

Induction Basis:

If | X |= 1, then x ∈ X is a minimal element, as x ≿ x holds by completeness.

Induction Step:

- Let |X| = n and consider some $x \in X$.
- By Lemma 3, ≿ restricted to the set X \ {x} is a weak preference relation and, by the induction hypothesis, X \ {x} has a minimal element *a*.
- If $x \succeq a$, then *a* is minimal in *X*, too.
- If x ≿ a, then a ≿ x by completeness, and by transitivity x is minimal in X.

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Existence with Finites Set of Alternatives

Existence of Maximal Elements

Lemma 5

Let *X* be a finite set, and $\succeq \subseteq X \times X$ be some weak preference relation on *X*. Then, there exists a maximal element, i.e. $b \in X$ such that $b \succeq x$ for all $x \in X$.

Proof of Lemma 5

Induction Basis:

If | X |= 1, then x ∈ X is a maximal element, as x ≿ x holds by completeness.

Induction Step:

- Let |X| = n and consider some $x \in X$.
- By Lemma 3, ≿ restricted to the set X \ {x} is a weak preference relation and, by the induction hypothesis, X \ {x} has a maximal element b.
- If $b \succeq x$, then *b* is maximal in *X*, too.
- If b ∠ x, then x ≿ b by completeness, and by transitivity x is maximal in X.

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Representation Theorem for Finite Sets

Proposition 5

Let *X* be a finite set. A binary relation $\succ \subseteq X \times X$ is a strict preference relation, if and only if, there exists a function $U : X \to \mathbb{R}$ such that for all $x, y \in X$ it is the case that

$$x \succ y$$
,

if and only if,

U(x) > U(y).

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Proof of the *if* **Direction** (\Leftarrow) of **Proposition 5**

- Let $U : X \to \mathbb{R}$ be a function such that for all $x, y \in X$ it is the case that $x \succ y$, if and only if, U(x) > U(y).
- Consider $a, b \in X$ such that $a \succ b$. Then, U(a) > U(b), which directly implies that $U(b) \neq U(a)$. It follows that $b \not\succeq a$. Hence, \succ is asymmetric.
- Consider $a, b, c \in X$ such that $a \neq b$ and $b \neq c$. Then, $U(a) \neq U(b)$ and $U(b) \neq U(c)$. It follows that $U(a) \leq U(b)$ and $U(b) \leq U(c)$. Thus, $U(a) \leq U(c)$, and therefore $U(a) \neq U(c)$. Consequently, $a \neq c$. Hence, \succ is negative transitive.

Proof of the *only if* Direction (\Rightarrow) of Proposition 5

By induction, it is shown that if |X| = n and \succ is a preference relation on *X*, then there exists a function $U : X \rightarrow (0; 1)$ such that for all $x, y \in X$ it is the case that $x \succ y$, if and only if, U(x) > U(y).

Induction Basis:

Let
$$|X| = 1$$
 and define $U(x) = \frac{1}{2}$ for $x \in X$.

Because \succ is asymmetric, $x \not\succ x$ holds.

- It is also the case, that $U(x) \neq U(x)$.
- Therefore, $x \succ y$, if and only if, U(x) > U(y) holds trivially.

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Induction Step:

- Suppose that, if |X| = n 1 and \succ is a preference relation on X, then there exists a function $U: X \to (0, 1)$ such that for all $x, y \in X$ it is the case that $x \succ y$, if and only if, U(x) > U(y).
- Let |X| = n and \succ be a preference relation on *X*.
- Consider some $x^{\circ} \in X$ and form the set $X' = X \setminus \{x^{\circ}\}$, where |X'| = n 1.
- If follows, by Lemma 2, that \succ restricted to $X \setminus \{x^\circ\}$ is a preference relation on $X \setminus \{x^\circ\}$.
- By the induction hypothesis, there exists a function $U': X' \to (0; 1)$ such that for all $x, y \in X'$ it is the case that $x \succ y$, if and only if, U'(x) > U'(y).

Four exhaustive cases are now considered:

- **1** There exists $x' \in X'$ such that $x^{\circ} \sim x'$.
- 2 $x^{\circ} \succ x'$ for all $x' \in X'$.
- 3 $x' \succ x^{\circ}$ for all $x' \in X'$.
- 4 $x^{\circ} \not\sim x'$ for all $x' \in X'$ and there exist $x'', x''' \in X'$ such that $x'' \succ x^{\circ}$ and $x^{\circ} \succ x'''$.

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Case 1:

There exists $x' \in X'$ such that $x^{\circ} \sim x'$.

Define $U: X \to (0; 1)$ such that

$$U(x) = \begin{cases} U'(x), & \text{if } x \in X', \\ U'(x'), & \text{if } x = x^{\circ}. \end{cases}$$

Firstly, if $x, y \in X'$, then $x \succ y$, if and only if, U'(x) > U'(y), by the induction hypothesis, if and only if, U(x) > U(y), as U coincides with U' on X'.

Secondly, if $x \in X'$ and $y = x^\circ$, then $x \succ x^\circ$, if and only if, $x \succ x'$, as $x^\circ \sim x'$, if and only if, U'(x) > U'(x'), by the induction hypothesis, if and only if, $U(x) > U(x^\circ)$, by definition of U.

Case 1 (continued):

- Thirdly, if $x = x^{\circ}$ and $y \in X'$, then $x^{\circ} \succ y$, if and only if, $x' \succ y$, as $x' \sim x^{\circ}$, if and only if, U'(x') > U'(y), by the induction hypothesis, if and only if, $U(x^{\circ}) > U(y)$, by definition of U.
- **Fourthly**, if $x = y = x^\circ$, then both $x^\circ \succ x^\circ$ as well as $U(x^\circ) > U(x^\circ)$ are impossible, hence $x \succ y$, if and only if, U(x) > U(y) holds trivially.

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Case 2:

• $x^{\circ} \succ x'$ for all $x' \in X'$.

Define $U: X \to (0; 1)$ such that

$$U(x)=egin{cases} U'(x), & ext{if } x\in X',\ rac{\max_{x\in X'}\left(U'(x)+1
ight)}{2}, & ext{if } x=x^{\circ}. \end{cases}$$

Firstly, if $x, y \in X'$, then proceed just as in **Case 1**.

Secondly, if $x \in X'$ and $y = x^{\circ}$, then $x \succ x^{\circ}$ is impossible as $x^{\circ} \succ x'$ for all $x' \in X'$ by assumption, and $U(x) > U(x^{\circ})$ is also impossible by the construction of *U*, hence $x \succ y$, if and only if, U(x) > U(y) holds trivially.

Case 2 (continued):

- Thirdly, if $x = x^{\circ}$ and $y \in X'$, then $x^{\circ} \succ y$ as $x^{\circ} \succ x'$ for all $x' \in X'$ by assumption, and $U(x^{\circ}) > U(y)$, by construction of U.
- **Fourthly**, if $x = y = x^{\circ}$, then proceed just as in **Case 1**.

Case 3:

•
$$x' \succ x^\circ$$
 for all $x' \in X'$.

Define $U: X \to (0; 1)$ such that

$$U(x) = \begin{cases} U'(x), & \text{if } x \in X', \\ \frac{\min_{x \in X'} (U'(x))}{2}, & \text{if } x = x^{\circ}. \end{cases}$$

Proceed analogously to Case 2.

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Case 4:

- $x^{\circ} \not\sim x'$ for all $x' \in X'$ and there exist $x'', x''' \in X'$ such that $x'' \succ x^{\circ}$ and $x^{\circ} \succ x'''$.
- By Lemma 4, there exist $\overline{x} \in X'$ such that \overline{x} is \succeq -minimal in the set $\{x' \in X' : x' \succ x^{\circ}\}$, and thus $U'(\overline{x}) = \min_{y \in X' : y \succ x^{\circ}} (U'(y))$
- Also, by Lemma 5, there exist $\underline{x} \in X'$ such that \underline{x} is \succeq -maximal in the set $\{x' \in X' : x^{\circ} \succ x'\}$, and thus $U'(\underline{x}) = \max_{y \in X' : x^{\circ} \succ y} (U'(y))$.

Define $U: X \to (0; 1)$ such that

$$U(x) = \begin{cases} U'(x), & \text{if } x \in X', \\ \frac{U'(\bar{x}) + U'(\underline{x})}{2}, & \text{if } x = x^{\circ}. \end{cases}$$

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Case 4 (continued):

- Since x̄ ≻ x° ≻ x̄, it follows by transitivity of ≻, that x̄ ≻ x̄, and thus U'(x̄) > U'(x̄) by construction of U.
- Therefore, $U(\bar{x}) > \frac{U(\bar{x}+U(\underline{x}))}{2} = U(x^{\circ}) > U(\underline{x})$, and hence the range of the function U is (0; 1).
- Moreover, note that if $x \in X'$ such that $x \succ x^{\circ}$, then $U'(x) \ge U'(\overline{x})$, and thus $x \succeq \overline{x}$.
- Also, it is the case that if $x \in X'$ such that $x^{\circ} \succ x$, then $U'(\underline{x}) \ge U'(x)$, and thus $\underline{x} \succeq x$.

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Case 4 (continued):

Firstly, if $x, y \in X'$, then proceed just as in **Case 1**.

- Secondly, if $x \in X'$ and $y = x^{\circ}$, then $x \succ x^{\circ}$, if and only if, $x \succeq \overline{x} \succ x^{\circ}$, if and only if, $U(x) \ge U(\overline{x}) > U(x^{\circ})$.
- Thirdly, if $x = x^{\circ}$ and $y \in X'$, then $x^{\circ} \succ y$, if and only if, $x^{\circ} \succ \underline{x} \succeq y$, if and only if, $U(x^{\circ}) > U(\underline{x}) \ge U(y)$.

Fourthly, if $x = y = x^{\circ}$, then proceed just as in **Case 1**.

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Proof of the *only if* Direction (\Rightarrow) of Proposition 5: Intuitive Recapitulation

- Assume inductively that the representation is possible for sets of size (n − 1), and consider some set X of size n as well as some subset X' of size (n − 1).
- Produce a representation U' for X', let x° denote the point left out, and investigate where U(x°) should lie.
- It will either be (Case 1) equal to some U'(x'), or (Case 2) to the right of all U'(x'), or (Case 3) to the left of all U'(x'), or (Case 4) between two U'(x')'s.
- **Put** $U(x^{\circ})$ where it belongs, respectively.
- All the detail in the proof is to show that what results indeed satisfies x > y, if and only if, U(x) > U(y) for all x, y ∈ X.